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AT THE START OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM, MORE THAN ONEperson in three in the world suffers hardship andindignity from the problem of water. This person is
much more often a woman than a man. This injustice is
largely unspoken and one of the most difficult to rectify, pre-
cisely because it is above all an injustice to women. Its root
cause is our negligence and our resignation in the face of
inequality. Yet while over the next fifty years more than half
of mankind is threatened by “water stress”, the dream of
pure water for all continues to unite humanity. The group
whose report I present here is witness to the remarkable work
of the many men and women who are striving to realise this
dream.
It was not our task to philosophise about this drama. Rather,
coming after all the work done on the technical aspects of
the problem, our remit was to explore its financial aspects,
seemingly for the first time. Against the background of the
Millennium celebrations and the Johannesburg Earth
Summit, all the member states of the United Nations are com-
mitted, by 2015, to reducing by half the proportion of the
world’s population without access to water and sanitation.
Our main task has been to indicate the financial means for
achieving this.
This is the aim of the pages that follow. They are the fruit of
the work of a group of men and women from diverse back-
grounds. They have put all their resources, commitment, abil-
ity and experience into this work. The most difficult thing for
them—as it is for me now—has been to draw the work to its
end, since time is upon us.  Our feeling is that we are far from
having plumbed the depths of the problem, and we have had
to confine ourselves to exploring what has to be done within
the limits of our available resources. We have not been able
to call upon any single specialised institution, since amongst
international organisations water—this vital good—is sur-
prisingly an orphan. Much of the information needed to
define a strategy is still missing. 
For all its limitations, the report brings a key message. The
dream of pure water for all is within the reach of humanity.
It can be attained by continuing for a further ten years the
effort to which we are committed from now to 2015. This is
the challenging task for the generation of people now run-
ning the world!
This effort must involve all parties acting together, since in
the past they have too often tended to shift responsibilities
to each other. The problem needs tackling at a global level,
and can only be solved if all the various parties accept the
need to change their approach, in some cases radically. This
applies not just to governments in the North and South but
also to towns, regions, nongovernmental organisations, com-
munities, civil society, public services, companies, banks, mul-
tilateral organisations and others, each of which must
redouble its efforts.
Financial flows, our main concern, need to at least double.
They will have to come from financial markets, from water
authorities themselves through tariffs, from multilateral
financial institutions, from governments, and from public
development aid, preferably in the form of grants. How could
it be otherwise? This is basically a question of giving our
brothers and sisters what they need to drink. The Universal
Declaration of the Rights of Man, in its first article, sets each
person the overriding duty of “acting towards others in a
spirit of fraternity”.
This doubling, or more, of the volume of finance has not
daunted our group. We see it as an indispensable investment
if humanity wants to achieve its other aims for health, uni-
versal primary education—above all of girls—and reducing
absolute poverty by half between now and 2015.  The world
is capable of this effort. But it will make no sense and will not
happen unless there is an equally unprecedented effort to
reform the way the entire world tackles its water problem.
This concerns those at all levels of responsibility, from village
communities up to the United Nations. The first set of our
proposals is addressed to these preconditions, which are
essentially about good governance, responsibility, the partic-
ipation of civil society, decentralisation and transparency. Our
feeling is that the future of water is linked to a more partici-
patory form of managing society, in which women take their
rightful place. Not surprisingly, this inversion in the method
of governance will require a corresponding inversion in the
financial architecture.  
That, briefly, is the core of the three-phase strategy for the
next twenty-five years that we are proposing to the interna-
tional community at the Kyoto Forum.
MICHEL CAMDESSUS
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THE PANEL WAS FORMED AS A JOINT INITIATIVE OF THE GLOBALWater Partnership, the World Water Council, and the3rd World Water Forum in Kyoto. In their commis-
sioning letter, the sponsors invited the Chairman to form “a
panel of financial experts to address the ways and means of
attracting new financial resources to the water field.” Its
report should contain “new proposals on the financial
aspects as well as on the enabling environment that has an
impact on those flows”. 
Constituted in late 2001, the panel comprises 20 personali-
ties with top-level experience in government, finance
ministries, international development finance agencies, com-
mercial banks and other funding bodies, water companies,
non-governmental organisations active in the water sector,
plus eminent independent professionals. A number of mem-
bers appointed colleagues to act as alternates to ensure con-
tinuity of representation.
The panel held seven full meetings in 2002 and early 2003,
in Paris (twice), Manila, Washington, The Hague,
Johannesburg and London. These meetings typically included
presentations and evidence from water or financial special-
ists on local and general topics, as well as internal panel dis-
cussions. In addition to the seven full meetings, the chairman
and various other panel members and supporters attended
other related meetings. 
In recent years, there have been many conferences, reports
and papers on global water problems, and the panel has not
wished to duplicate these—or to go over familiar ground on
which there is an international consensus. This report
acknowledges some of the key milestones in the development
of the prevailing consensus. It sketches in elements of the
present situation and its perception of the causes of the cur-
rent problem, as background to the presentation of its pro-
posals. It takes for granted the conventional views of the
sector’s global financial needs and does not offer new and
original estimates of its own. 
The Panel has considered that its central responsibility was to
answer the question: how to find the appropriate financial
resources for the achievement of the two Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) for water access and sanitation.
It is, nevertheless of the view that such targets cannot be sep-
arated from the consideration of the financial needs of all the
different aspects of the water sector. These include all water
uses, such as household water and sanitation, wastewater
collection and treatment, irrigation and drainage, industrial
water use, hydropower and navigation. The scope also
includes resource management questions, such as watershed
and river basin management, flood control, environmental
protection, data gathering and climatic prediction. But the
report does not pretend to be comprehensive in its propos-
als, which have been conditioned by the expertise and time
available. The report deal in some depth with the water and
sanitation sector, and dwells much less on other areas.
Geographically, the focus of the report is on developing and
transitional countries of Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa,
the Middle East, Asia, Oceania and Central & Eastern Europe
and the former Commonwealth of Independent States. The
term “global” in the report refers to these regions. 
Why water? 
The formation of the panel, and the proposals contained in
the following pages, stem from a belief that water is one of
the most important issues in the world today. This is so for a
number of reasons.
First, access to water is a right and a basic need. The UN’s
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recently
stated1:
“The human right to water is indispensable for leading a life
in human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realisation of
other human rights”
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Second, although water is the subject of only one of the goals
contained in the Millennium Declaration, it is vital to achiev-
ing the others, such as poverty, education and gender equal-
ity. To take just three examples: providing segregated toilet
facilities in schools is in many societies a pre-condition for the
further education of girls; the availability of private toilets and
water in-house or close by would make a big difference to the
lives of millions of women; and irrigation is and will increas-
ingly be a prerequisite to increasing food production to feed
the growing world population.
Third, water has been underemphasied and neglected in the
past, compared to other sectors. The costs of neglect, which
are cumulative, are now better understood than in the past. 
Fourth, access to clean water and proper sanitation, and
attention to wastewater disposal and treatment, has proven
benefits to public health. Poor water and sanitation is an
important cause of diseases such as diarrhea (4 bn cases each
year, with 2.2 mn deaths), intestinal worms (affecting 10%
of the population of the developing world) blindness from tra-
choma (6 mn cases), cholera (where there have been 90 sep-
arate outbreaks since 1996) and schistosomiasis (200 mn
people infected).2 Carrying water long distances and waiting
at water sources wastes the energy and time particularly of
women and children, at the expense of family activities, edu-
cation and productive work.
Fifth, effective water resources development and manage-
ment are basic to sustainable growth and poverty reduction,
in several ways. Broad-based water resources interventions
such as major infrastructure provide national, regional, and
local benefits from which all people, including the poor, can
gain. Because it is usually the poor who live in degraded land-
scapes, interventions aimed at improving catchment quality
and provide livelihoods for the poor are of major importance.
Broad-based water service interventions (aimed at improving
the performance of water supply and energy utilities, user
associations and irrigation departments) benefit everyone,
including the poor. Finally, water service interventions (such
as water and sanitation and irrigation services for the
unserved poor) play a major role in reaching some of the
MDGs. 
The inclusion of water as a target under the UN Millennium
Development Goals, and the addition of sanitation, in the
2002 Earth Summit, are potentially fundamental steps for
human life and dignity. It is the remit of the panel and the aim
of this report to identify the policies and resources needed to
make them real.
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the evolution of
a consensus1
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OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS OR SO THERE HAS BEEN GREAT PROGRESSin international understanding of global water prob-lems, culminating in international commitments to
tackle the worst deficits. So the panel does not start from
scratch: there is substantial agreement on many important
issues, with targets set for policymakers to attain. Some of the
landmarks particularly relevant to financing are discussed
here (Panel 1.1).3
In Rio de Janeiro in 1992 the UN Conference on Environment
and Development set the stage and much of the agenda for
subsequent discussions of water as an environmental
resource, agent and victim. The Conference adopted Agenda
21, a catalogue of issues and measures, with Chapter 18
devoted to water.
Also in 1992 the International Conference on Water and the
Environment in Dublin issued four guiding principles, one of
which was that “water has an economic value in all its com-
peting uses and should be recognised as an economic good.”
Everyone should have access to water and sanitation at an
affordable price. But the failure to place a price on water that
reflects its economic value in its various alternative uses
encourages wasteful and environmentally damaging use and
results in its misallocation. Since Dublin there has been
greater willingness to accept pricing and other market mech-
anisms in managing water, recognising that these are merely
tools (the market is a good servant but a bad master). There
has also been considerable debate about how pricing can be
reconciled with affordability, especially for poor consumers.
Another Dublin principle, that water should be managed in a
“holistic” manner, has been taken up by the Global Water
Partnership, formed in 1996, with Integrated Water Resource
Management (IWRM) as a policy framework for managing the
sector.4 One basic aspect of IWRM is a distinction between
water values and water charges. Its values in different uses
should be recognised and used to guide allocation between
different sectors. Its charges should be applied where appro-
priate to provide the right incentives for users’ behaviour. In
IWRM, pricing has the dual aspect of a management tool and
as a means for cost recovery. 
The World Water Council, formed in 1996 as a think tank on
international water policy issues, had as one of its first tasks
organising the First World Water Forum in Marrakech in
1997. The Forum gave the WWC a mandate to conduct a
three-year study of global water, including its financial
aspects. The World Commission for Water in the 21st Century
was formed to oversee the work, and its report, “A water
secure world,” was presented and debated at the Second
World Water Forum in The Hague in 2000. 
That report, and its background papers,5 indicated that addi-
tional annual investment of about $100 billion was required
in all branches of the water sector. Its other messages: More
should be done at the country and basin level to identify
financial resources and investment needs and to provide the
incentives to encourage this finance. New investment should
be mobilised from the international private sector, with more
recognition aroused in the international ethical investment
community. Locally, development banks and microcredit
mechanisms needed to be used more fully.
The consensus gained impetus through two key conferences
in 2000 and 2001. The Second World Water Forum in The
Panel 1.1 Landmarks
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro
1992 International Conference on Water and the Environment,
Dublin
1996 Formation of the Global Water Partnership and World Water
Council
1997 1st First World Water Forum, Marrakech
1997 Formation of World Commission for Water in the 21st
Century
2000 2nd World Water Forum, The Hague
2001 International Conference on Freshwater, Bonn
2001 UN Millennium Declaration
2001 New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)
2002 UN Conference on the Finance of Development, Monterrey
2002 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development,
Johannesburg
2003 3rd World Water Forum, Kyoto
Hague in 2000 issued seven challenges, one to value water in
all its uses. An implication is pricing water services to reflect
their cost of provision, taking into account equity and the
basic needs of the poor. 
The Ministerial Declaration of the International Conference
on Freshwater in Bonn, 2001 stressed the urgency of using
existing resources more efficiently and attracting extra financ-
ing from all sources. The Bonn Recommendations for Action
noted that public budgets were likely to remain the biggest
source of investment—hence the importance of measures to
strengthen public finances and, where public funds were
scarce, to target them to the basic needs of the poor. National
capital markets should be tapped, for instance through the
issue of bonds. Water service providers should aim for finan-
cial sustainability through improved cost efficiency. But the
affordability of their services should be assured by various
means, including transparent public subsidies to the social
target groups and cross-subsidies from other users. 
It was recognised at Bonn that public funding for water
needed to be augmented by private capital. This could take
the form of public-private partnerships, which did not imply
private ownership of water resources and assets. In any case,
such partnerships were not to be imposed by donors as a con-
dition of funding. They were to make water a more attractive
investment opportunity, requiring good regulation and legal
systems, transparent contracting procedures, reliable cost
recovery and public acceptance. For this, local self-help efforts
should be promoted to reduce external financial needs,
including help for NGOs. Development aid should be
increased to conform to UN targets, to leverage other sources
and, given its scarcity, to target the needs of the poor. 
International targets
The targets of halving service deficits in global water and san-
itation started to appear in reports and conference declara-
tions in the late 1990s, such as the World Water Vision
presented at The Hague in 2000. They were given even more
powerful expression in the Millennium Declaration of 2000
and the conclusions of the Earth Summit in 2002.
In its Millennium Declaration, the United Nations set a target
for 2015 of reducing by half the proportion of people with-
out sustainable access to adequate quantities of affordable
and safe water.6 The UN World Summit on Sustainable
Development, in Johannesburg, explicitly extended the target
to include sanitation. 
These targets, for 2015, should be viewed as stepping stones
on the path to full global service coverage and other aspects
of global water security by 2025, the perspective of the GWP
in its Framework for Action.7 It should be recalled that the
2025 targets include irrigation, industrial effluent, waste-
water treatment, water resource and environmental man-
agement, while the 2015 target is concerned only with
household water and sanitation.
In 2000 an estimated 1.1 billion people lacked access to safe
water supply and 2.4 billion to improve sanitation. Allowing
for the expected growth in population, reaching the UN tar-
gets would entail providing water to an additional 1.5 billion
people (1.0 billion urban, 0.5 billion rural) and basic sanita-
tion to an extra 2 billion (1.0 billion urban, 1.0 billion rural) by
2015. In the years before 2015, attaining the targets would
mean daily global connection rates of several hundred thou-
sand for both water and sanitation, depending on the source
of the estimate.
Financing requirements
Discussions of finance tend to be dominated by investment
needs. But it is equally important to provide for recurring
expenditure on administrative overheads, operations, main-
tenance, routine repairs and periodic replacements. A com-
mon assumption is that these are covered by the normal
revenues of water utilities. But this is often not the case, and
shortfalls on repairs and maintenance lead to a need for
higher investment in due course. Up to a point, adequate
budgeting for recurrent spending items, backed by good cost
recovery, can minimise future investment needs.
Estimates of the current annual resources financing new
infrastructure in the water sectors of developing and transi-
tional countries are very broad, as are its future requirements.
The GWP in its Framework for Action, produced the figures
in table 1.1, generally accepted as the right orders of
magnitude:
Nearly all the extra financing for household services should be
for sanitation. However, the current annual flow of invest-
ment in drinking water supply has just been sufficient in the
past decade to maintain at 1.1 billion the number of people
without adequate access to drinking water.8 The estimate of
the above table regarding drinking water is therefore signifi-
cantly underestimated.9 By far the largest increase in funds
will be required for the treatment of wastewater from both
households and industry, now grossly underprovided. The
item “environmental protection” includes flood control and
water resources management in its various forms. Estimates
for both drinking water and sanitation depend on the level of
service and the technical option chosen, on which the GWP
takes a pragmatic stance. 
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The costs of meeting the 2015 targets also depend crucially
on assumptions about the type and level of service. This is in
turn affected by the strategy to reduce the service deficit—the
countries, the urban-rural balance of the target group, and
the half of the unserved population addressed first. Using the
most basic standards of service and technology, the 2015
goals could be attained at an extra annual investment cost of
about $10 billion10 But providing full water and sewerage con-
nections and primary wastewater treatment to the urban pop-
ulations would raise the annual cost of the 2015 goal to $17
billion for water and $32 billion for sanitation and sewerage.11
The broad ranges of the above estimates are of course due
to the scarcity of reliable data in many countries in a sector
on which public attention has not so far concentrated. The
Panel had to acknowledge that we still lack the solid infor-
mation basis on which to build a global strategy. The need to
avail ourselves with more precise quantification, before sug-
gesting detailed steps, lies behind the three-stage strategy
this report recommends.
Financial initiatives
Africa is at the forefront of international water concerns, and
in 2001 the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD) was launched. It was to be thereafter endorsed by
the African Union, spotlighting African ownership and lead-
ership in tackling the continent’s problems. NEPAD supports
public-private partnerships as a means of attracting extra
finance for such sectors as water. The African Development
Bank has been given a particular but shared responsibility for
infrastructure, and is closely associated with the development
of proposals for an African Water Facility as an investment
support vehicle and aid to capacity building.
The UN Conference on Financing for Development, at
Monterrey in 2002, signified a potentially major change of
trend in international aid for development, including water.
Governments and agencies committed themselves to increas-
ing their aid by 25%, which would raise an extra $12 or so
billion a year. If realised, this would set aid for water on a new
trajectory: in 1999–2001 annual average commitments of aid
to water supply and sanitation from all sources had fallen to
$3.1 billion, down from $3.5 billion in 1996–98.12
Apart from the formal inclusion of sanitation in the 2015 tar-
get, the Johannesburg Summit was notable in other respects.
It was the occasion for announcements of pledges and pro-
grammes by the United States, the EU and other bilateral and
multilateral donors, and extra resources for various UN pro-
grammes. There was recognition of the need for water stor-
age and hydropower development, including dams of all
sizes, which signified an important change of mood.13 The
business sector, in the Business Action for Sustainable
Development, played a prominent and constructive role,
stressing the need for an enabling environment, using aid for
capacity building, involving all water stakeholders and con-
sulting users, and moving to full cost recovery. 
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Table 1.1 Indicative annual investment in water
services for developing countries
Annual costs
2002–2025
Today (billions of US$)
Drinking water 13 13+
Sanitation and hygiene 1 17
Municipal wastewater treatment 14 70
Industrial effluent 7 30
Agriculture 32.5 40
Environmental protection 7.5 10
Total 75 180
Source: GWP, “Towards Water Security: a Framework for Action”, and John Briscoe,
“The financing of hydropower, irrigation, and water supply infrastructure in develop-
ing countries,” in Water Resources Development, (Vol. 15, no. 4, 1999. Figures include
15% allowance for O&M.
Note: Investment in hydropower (about $15 billion) is not separately identified. Because
larger schemes are usually multipurpose, some of this cost would be included in the
Agriculture and Environmental Protection categories, and the remainder would be
attributed to the power sector. 
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THE “WATER SECTOR” HAS MANY FACETS, BUT THE MOST BASICdistinction is between water as a resource to be devel-oped and managed for the benefit of all its functions
and users, and water as a service, to be provided to its many
users after abstraction from the resource. Both aspects need
financing, and both are currently deficient.
Start with water as a resource. All countries need adequate
water infrastructure, but those with dry or highly variable cli-
mates need more than others. Around the world, countries
vary greatly in their stock of hydraulic infrastructure. The
western United States, Australia and Ethiopia have similar cli-
mates, but the United States and Australia have around 5,000
m3 of water storage capacity per person, while Ethiopia has
only 50 m3—Africa and the Middle East only 1000 m3.14 The
need for more storage is likely to become even more acute
with global climate change. 
Another measure of grossly unequal endowments is the
development of the hydropower potential in different
regions. In Europe and North America more than 70% of
hydro-potential has been developed, in South America 40%,
in Asia about 30% and in China 20%. Many dams are mul-
tipurpose, important for flood protection as in China. 
Africa is particularly disadvantaged. Its available water
resources are grossly underused. Only 3% of its renewable
water is withdrawn annually for domestic, agricultural and
industrial use, in a continent where 40% of the population
has inadequate access to water and sanitation. Only 6% of
Africa’s cultivated land is irrigated, and less than 5% of its
hydropower potential is used.15
Not all the cost of water resource management consists of
physical infrastructure. Other aspects include data collection,
weather forecasting, afforestation, land use regulation, con-
junctive use of surface and ground water, conservation meas-
ures, ecosystem management and pollution control. Most
have to be funded from local government recurrent budgets,
but there has been widespread underfunding of these essen-
tial services, with flood control as a problem in many regions,
requiring a mixture of infrastructure and management
measures. 
The second facet of the water sector is the provision of serv-
ices, and here again there are large global deficits. Africa has
38% of its population unserved by safe water and 40% by
sanitation Asia has 19% without safe water, 52% without
sanitation. Latin America and Caribbean 15% without water
and 22% without sanitation. Although a huge number of
additional people obtained access to services in the 1990s
(800 million to water and 750 million to sanitation) popula-
tion growth meant that the coverage for urban water actu-
ally decreased, while the absolute number of people without
access to water and sanitation remained the same. Looking
ahead to the next 25 years, the urban populations in Africa
and Asia will almost double, and that in Latin America and
the Caribbean will increase by 50%. 
Sewerage and wastewater treatment are even less devel-
oped. Although comprehensive estimates are not available, a
large part of the sewage in most developing cities is not col-
lected, but instead disposed of in unsanitary ways that endan-
ger public health. Moreover, much sewage that is collected
is released untreated, or treated to an unsatisfactory stan-
dard. At any time, many wastewater treatment plants are not
operating at all, or not working properly, because of finan-
cial and technical problems.  
Industrial effluent—untreated, or not treated to proper stan-
dards—is a serious pollutant of rivers and coastal waters,
causing environmental damage harmful to both humans and
wildlife. Enterprises, both private and public, in developing
and transitional countries, have very large backlogs of invest-
ment in effluent treatment.
Water services to agriculture, deficient in serious respects, will
be even more severely challenged in coming decades. In
developing countries irrigated agriculture accounts for 40%
of all crop production and 60% of cereals. Over the next 30
years it is estimated that arable irrigated land would need to
increase by 22%, and water withdrawals by 14%, to meet
the demands of a larger world population.16 These data imply
major efforts to improve the productivity of land and efficient
use of water. Major reforms will be required to reduce the
incidence of famines and ongoing malnutrition (recall that the
Millennium Development Goals include the target of halving
by 2015 the proportion of people who suffer from hunger).
Agriculture will compete with other sectors for a limited water
resource. Yet irrigation service providers are often inefficient
and underfunded, with badly maintained systems, and large
areas of land degraded by water-logging and salinisation.17
Trends in funding for investment in water
Water infrastructure is ultimately paid for by one of three par-
ties: water users, through their own outlays or through water
bills paid to official water service providers; taxpayers, though
various local or national fiscal flows; or aid donors, including
private voluntary contributions (box 2.1).
Financing water infrastructure means spending cash to
finance long-term physical assets. This is financed by the pres-
ent cash flow or reserves of the water undertaking, or by tak-
ing on loans or equity, which have to be reimbursed over time
by water users or fiscal transfers. Such financing sources are
only feasible if long term reimbursement by users, taxpayers
or donors is possible. 
The largest funding sources are local, such as governments,
local banks and users, all difficult to quantify in global terms.
In contrast, the contributions of international aid, foreign
banks and private companies are much more, easily seen,
though less important. The balance between sources varies
according to which part of the water sector is being
discussed:
Water and sanitation.18 In the mid-1990s the breakdown of
financial sources was estimated to be: domestic public sector
65–70%, domestic private sector 5%, international donors
10–15% and international private companies 10–15%.
Irrigation and drainage. There are no reliable estimates of
global investment in irrigation. Large public sector schemes
are funded mainly by local public agencies and international
aid, with smaller schemes and on-farm investments mainly
privately financed by farmers, informal credit, and banks.19
Hydropower. Private finance has covered less than 10% of
annual investment, mainly for small run-of-the-river schemes
and rehabilitation projects. For various reasons, governments,
aid donors and international development agencies finance
the great bulk of this sector, though in some cases this sup-
ports private lending through guarantees. In recent years,
donors and MFIs have reduced their support to this sector.20
Public funding obviously remains important, but it is a
hostage to the fiscal position of developing countries. More
governments have delegated financial responsibilities to
local authorities and are interested in public-private offers.
Without firmer evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that
public funding of the water sector has at best been
stationary. 
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• Water users, such as households, farmers and businesses.
Householders, particularly in rural areas and in poorer urban districts,
invest their cash, labor and materials in wells, pipes, basic sanitation
and other facilities. Farmers invest large sums in tubewells, pumps
and surface irrigation systems, either on their own or as members of
associations and user groups. In some regions, farmers with surplus
water from their own sources invest in distribution systems to dis-
pose of their surplus to others. Industrial and commercial firms often
develop their own water supplies and effluent treatment facilities.
Some large firms even supply the general population. Users also
cross-subsidise each other through paying different tariffs.
• Informal suppliers. In cities where growth has outstripped the pub-
lic network, local entrepreneurs, often acting outside the law, fill the
vacuum by selling water in bulk from tankers—or in containers and
bottles. 
• Public water authorities and utilities, which fund recurrent
spending and some new investment from revenues provided by user
charges (gross operating cash flow), loans and sometimes public
subsidies.
• Private companies, either local or foreign, providing funds from
sources similar to public utilities, plus equity injection.
• Non-governmental organisations and local communities, rais-
ing funds from voluntary private contributions or grants from inter-
national agencies.
• Local banks and other financial institutions, offering short-term
or medium-term loans at market rates.
• International banks and export credit agencies, providing larger
volumes of finance than local sources, against corporate guarantees
or project cash flow
• International aid from multilateral and bilateral sources, avail-
able as loans on concessional terms or grants
• Multilateral financial institutions: Loans on near-market terms
• Environmental and water funds
• National central and local governments, providing subsidies,
guarantees of loans, and proceeds of bond issues.
Box 2.1 Where the funds for water come from
The water sector’s funding of investment from its own cash
flow has shown little change. In a major review of its projects
in the water and sanitation, the World Bank concludes that
“financial sustainability of the service providers and resource
mobilisation for sector development...remain elusive
goals.”21 In fact, the measure of financial sustainability used
by the Bank’s OED was slightly worse in 1999 than in 199022.
International aid for water and sanitation has fallen in the last
few years—(at $3.1 billion a year in 1999–2001, compared
with $3.5 billion in 1996–98). Loans from the main MFIs to
the water sector have shown a varied trend. World Bank
annual lending approvals for water and sanitation averaged
$1.1 billion in 1999–2001, slightly down from ($1.25 billion)
in 1990–98 but with great year-to-year variation. IADB lend-
ing for water and sanitation was clearly lower in 1996–2001
($400 million a year) than in 1991–95 ($640 million a year).
The AsDB’s lending has been rising, though with year to year
fluctuations ($275 million a year in 1996–2000, compared
with $200 million a year in 1990–95). Lending by the AfDB
has been rising, though at a lower level than those above.
Aid for irrigation and drainage, and for hydropower, has
declined substantially in the last decade. The World Bank and
IADB have practically ceased lending to large new water stor-
age projects in response to the current hostility to such
schemes, though the decline is less marked, from a much
lower base, for the AfDB and AsDB. 
International private investment and commercial bank lend-
ing, never large, have suffered from the general decline in
private flows since their peak in 1996–97. Water and sew-
erage projects received only 5.4% of all private commit-
ments to infrastructure in the 1990s. Year to year the figures
fluctuate widely—$2 billion in 1998, $7 billion in 1999, $4.5
billion in 2000.23 However available figures do not accurately
reflect the contribution of the private sector to funding
water infrastructure since they include commitments made
to governments (e.g. the cost of buying existing assets), and
do not assess year by year the creation of new physical
assets.
Commercial banks are now much more cautious in lending to
emerging markets than before 1996. The pool of private com-
panies with the resources and willingness to invest in overseas
water projects has also shrunk, leaving the ones that remain
more risk-averse. Nevertheless, these companies remain an
invaluable source of know-how and of potential for innova-
tion. In the framework of well designed Private Sector
Participation (PSP) schemes they could be essential actors in
responding to the needs of a rapidly urbanising world.
Private or public water operators?
The ownership of the water industry generates passionate
debate. The panel, by contrast, takes a pragmatic view of the
issue based on its observations of past experience, the cur-
rent situation, and future requirements. For the 40 years after
1950, aid and MFI lending for water went entirely to public
authorities with large sums disbursed. The central areas and
affluent suburbs of big cities were served, but by the late
1980s in rural areas and poor suburbs the situation remained
unsatisfactory. Too many utilities were poorly managed—and
poorly supervised by the regulatory authorities.
By 1980 private operations in water were limited essentially
to France, some small areas of Great Britain, the utility-owned
distribution schemes in the United States, some cities in
Spain, and parts of francophone Africa. The divestiture of the
UK water infrastructure to the private sector in 1989 created
great international interest. People who witnessed for
decades the difficulties public utilities were facing in their
attempts to reform themselves to be more efficient, less
prone to corruption, more open to their clients and to the
public became interested in what the private sector could
offer in a range of emerging economies. The contractual
agreements made in other countries were of various kinds,
but they rarely followed the British model of full divestiture.
The various other models of public-private partnership leave
the ownership of the infrastructure and the overall control of
the policy environment and the resource with governments,
while private operators are contracted to perform certain
tasks in operations and expansion of infrastructure.
The experience of the past 15 years can be summarised as fol-
lows. The introduction of private operators in a country that
has no experience in this matter is a long and difficult process.
Compared with other types of infrastructure, the water sec-
tor has been the least attractive to private investors, and the
sums involved have been the smallest. Only 3% of the pop-
ulation of poor or emerging countries is now served by oper-
ators that are fully or partially private. The 1.1 billion people
without access to potable water and 2.4 without basic sani-
tation are in regions still served by public authorities and pub-
lic utilities.
Most private operations have achieved real progress in effi-
ciency and, when required by the authorities and as part of
their contracts, affordably served poor suburbs.24 Some cases
have failed, mostly due to insufficient preparation. The trend
of private operation has come to a virtual standstill since the
economic crisis in Argentina and elsewhere, and the brutal
devaluations. 
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A ray of hope
It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the global water
sector in its many forms is in disastrous condition. Water is
not being sufficiently developed and conserved. Physical
infrastructure is lagging behind need. Sector management is
deficient, services are deteriorating, and deficits growing.
Allied to this is a shortage of financial resources going into
the sector. Indeed, the financial situation has been getting
worse in the last few years, and the sector shows no sign of
generating the funds to meet future service targets. 
A rapid overview of this kind inevitably oversimplifies and fails
to do justice to the many governments, municipalities, vil-
lages, companies, and user associations, which are rising to
the challenges they confront.25 Even the global rate of water
connections in the 1990s is impressive in absolute terms and
in relation to the scale of previous efforts. But it has been out-
paced by the growth in population. Generally speaking, the
technology is well-known and straightforward, and the wide-
spread demand for the service is backed by a willingness to
pay. The need for policy and institutional reform to make sus-
tainable changes has also emerged as a global consensus and
the reforms and institutions required are becoming better
understood and already exist in different places. The chal-
lenge is to generalise these successes—and to bring the many
up to the standards of the few.
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ALL THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE PANEL GIVES A CONSISTENTpicture. Serious defects in the “governance” of theglobal water sector hamper its ability to generate and
attract finance. But even if these deficits were overcome,
inherent features in this sector would pose risks to potential
operators, lenders and investors. This chapter deals first with
governance issues, then turns to the specific risks of the water
sector in its main branches. It concludes with the interaction
of country risk and project size on financing options.
Governance
The following issues seem to be important:
● The apparent low priority that central governments give
to water sector issues.
● Confusion of social, environmental and commercial aims.
● Political interference.
● Poor management structures and imprecise objectives for
water undertakings.
● An inadequate general legal framework.
● Lack of transparency in the award of contracts.
● Non-existent, or weak and inexperienced regulators.
● Resistance to cost-recovering tariffs.
All governments, agreeing on the importance of water, sub-
scribe to internationally inspired commitments and under-
takings. But their spending performance is at odds with their
rhetoric: in most countries the water sector is given a dispro-
portionately small share in the budget. Part of the explana-
tion is that water tends to be a local responsibility, and local
and national priorities differ. There is also a tradition, espe-
cially in poorer countries, of reliance on foreign aid for new
water investments. It is also true that some aspects of this sec-
tor are unglamorous, practically invisible in electoral terms.26
With the mass of people not serviced politically weak or dis-
empowered, it is tempting to postpone spending on mainte-
nance and periodic replacements, likewise on investments
with a long gestation period. Nor is water a priority in the use
of resources saved from debt relief. Few Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers give priority to water, and some omit it
completely.
Because water is a basic resource serving many functions, it
is often expected to pursue conflicting aims. The social and
public health benefits of providing adequate clean water and
sanitation to all may be incompatible with full cost recovery
and financial self-sufficiency. Wastewater treatment to fulfill
environmental responsibilities to downstream users and
neighbouring states may not be financially feasible. Providing
cheap or free irrigation water as a contribution to a national
cheap-food policy is likely to deprive the irrigation agency of
funds to maintain its system. Many irrigation agencies and
water departments are grossly over-manned, in a misguided
attempt to create employment. As a general rule, it is prefer-
able to make a distinction between the various policy aims to
which water contributes, and, so far as possible, to arrange
funding for each in an explicit manner. 
In different countries, there are many different ways of
organising the water sector, reflecting local political, cultural
and administrative traditions. In many cases water is still oper-
ated from a local government department, or as a nation-
alised industry, or as part of a ministry. In some cases, it is an
autonomous agency, and there are now many examples of
privatisation in its various forms. Although each case has pros
and cons, and no model for reform is universally valid, it is
important to be able to hold the sector organisations to
account for their own performance. This normally implies
having separate accounts, some managerial, commercial and
financial autonomy, and clear and consistent objectives set
by governments, municipalities or users. These principles are
valid whether water is operated in the private or public sec-
tor. In reality, the failure to follow these principles means that
there is widespread inefficiency and waste in this sector, cou-
pled with arbitrary political interference.
Attracting finance into the water sector, particularly of a novel
type, presupposes a supportive legal framework, containing
such features as: corporate laws permitting the structure of
corporate vehicles; the concept of freedom of contract for a
project and the enforceability of commercial contracts; ade-
quate investment protection laws; clear authority for the pub-
lic sector to enter in public-private partnerships; lenders able
to obtain effective security; supportive banking laws; sector-
specific legislation; confidence in the impartiality and compe-
tence of the judiciary, if local enforcement is necessary. The
absence of such legal foundations makes attracting finance
more difficult.
The water sector is prone to corruption, like any other, in soci-
eties where this is endemic. The willingness of companies, or
pressure on them, to make bribes or other favours in order to
win business has insidious effects, raising the cost of the deal,
increasing its debt burden, distorting the shape of the proj-
ect and demoralising staff in the agency being bribed.
Corruption can be a factor whether the sector is privately or
publicly operated. Such behaviour is now becoming riskier as
it is exposed by international pressure. But until all parties sub-
scribe to the same rules and standards of ethical behaviour,
the more principled companies will be discouraged from
seeking business in these cases.
Regulation is a necessary part of placing water agencies at
arms’ length from governments and making their behaviour
accountable to the public. Although regulation is usually seen
as a precondition of private sector involvement, it has an
essential role in the public sector too, wherever an agency is
accountable for its performance. Unfortunately, there are
very few examples of good, experienced regulators in the
water sector in developing countries. Most are recent, weak
and subject to government interference, struggling to cope
with the impact of macroeconomic events on major conces-
sions. Where regulation is absent or weak, neither compa-
nies, governments nor the general public have confidence in
the processes concerned, and investment suffers.
Most water undertakings do not cover their full costs—oper-
ations, maintenance and capital items—and hence rely on
public subsidies.27 This precarious existence makes them the
victims of periodic budgetary crises. There is little political will
to raise tariffs, even to cover O & M expenses, despite the pos-
sibility of designing tariff structures that cushion the water
bills of the poorest and the use of the social security budget
to subsidise deserving cases. Many utilities are trapped in a
vicious spiral of weak finances, underspending on essential
maintenance, declining service quality and resistance to pay
more for a poor service. This process is particularly evident in
public irrigation agencies, where cost recovery nearly every-
where very low, partly related to the depressing effect on
prices from farm subsidies in the OECD countries.
Specific risks of the water sector
The panel received evidence from a number of sources, which
were unanimous about the importance of the following spe-
cific risks, which apply to the commercial funding of water,
from both private and public sources. Some of them are not
unique to water, but they all apply with particular force to this
sector:
The typical project profile comprises a high investment in the
initial years with a large negative cash flow, eventually turn-
ing into a modest positive cash flow due to revenue increases,
which continues into the long term.28
● Project profile: capital intensity with high initial invest-
ment and long payback period
● Low sector rate of return
● Foreign exchange risk: mismatch between local currency
earnings and foreign currency funding
● Sub-sovereign risk: responsibility with local entities lack-
ing financial powers, resources & credit standing
● Risk of political pressure on contracts and tariffs and
absent, weak and/or inconsistent regulation
● Contractual risk: projects of long duration entered into
with poor initial information
Water, wastewater and hydro projects are among the most
capital-intensive of infrastructure investments. In the United
States, for instance, the ratio of capital investment to rev-
enues is twice as high in water as in natural gas, and 70%
higher than in electricity and telecommunications29. The
assets created are typically unusable for any other purpose
and cannot be removed, so the investor depends totally on
future revenue to obtain the desired return. When investment
is completed, the investor is totally at the mercy of the host
authorities (hence the importance of a strong and independ-
ent regulator).
Hydropower projects also have features that discourage pri-
vate finance—high front-end costs, high construction risk,
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environmental sensitivity, high capital intensity, heavy local
costs and long payback periods. In practice, only a small pro-
portion of hydro projects are privately financed, and they
tend to be small, run-of-the-river projects producing for base
load.30 Major public irrigation projects share some of the
same features, with the additional problem of poor cost
recovery, but there has been a high level of private invest-
ment into smaller schemes, especially those based on
groundwater. Much recent investment has also been in reha-
bilitation projects, avoiding sunk costs. 
Partly due to the delayed returns, coupled with resistance to
tariff increases, financial rates of return in the water sector
are among the lowest of any sectors.31 Contrary to the situ-
ation in developed countries, where water is considered a
very safe investment, the risk-adjusted return on water in
developing countries may be even lower than its nominal ex
ante level, for reasons set out below. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the last generation of irrigation projects has turned
in a good average ex post economic rate of return (15%, or
25% if weighted by area)32 though the financial rates of
return are probably less.
Practically all revenues from water projects are in local cur-
rencies. This implies that borrowings or investments that
have to be serviced, repaid or reimbursed in foreign curren-
cies carry a foreign exchange risk. In practice over the last
decade, most large private concessions and joint ventures
have been affected by devaluations in their host countries,
some disastrously. It is effectively impossible to insure
against foreign exchange risk. A common way of dealing
with devaluation contractually is to allow tariffs to increase
according to a formula that includes foreign exchange move-
ments, but in the case of massive changes such formulae are
usually sidelined because the implied tariff increases would
be unrealistic. 
The sub-sovereign risk in water was repeatedly stressed to the
panel. During the last two decades central governments have
devolved the responsibility for providing water services to
sub-sovereign bodies, such as municipalities or regional
agencies. But these entities have not been given equivalent
powers to raise finance. Cities that are larger and financially
stronger may have no difficulty raising bonds and loans on
their own account, but most depend on a central government
guarantee or other support, which is usually given sparingly
since it represents a contingency liability on the central
budget. Central government often bars sub-sovereigns from
raising money themselves. Municipalities also tend to lack
expertise in raising outside finance, and their financial man-
agement is weak. Some international financial agencies are
barred from lending at this level.
Because water is so important in people’s lives it is often
exploited for political reasons. Political risk arises when there
is a likelihood of politicians intervening to override the terms
of agreed contracts, or to exploit ambiguities in them. This is
particularly likely at the completion of an investment pro-
gramme, when tariff increases are due. A good system of reg-
ulation would contain such abuses, but where this is not
present, regulatory risk arises—investors and operators can-
not rely on a stable and impartial regime to govern their
activities. 
Contractual risk is present to a high degree, for two main rea-
sons. First, contracts in the water sector tend to have a long
life—typically 25–30 years. Over such a period the operating
environment is likely to change, because of changes in
national policy or water standards. Second, contracts are bid
for and accepted without the bidder having full information
about the extent and condition of the network (much of
which is underground) and its installations. Contracts may
not be flexible enough to accommodate subsequent adjust-
ments. Even where contracts contain dispute resolution
clauses, they may not deliver timely results, nor are they
always cost-effective. 
Country risk and project size
Country risk is a generic issue, not specific to water. The abil-
ity of governments, municipalities or water utilities to raise
funds either internally or externally is crucially affected by the
ratings given by one or other of the ratings agencies.
Agencies use different criteria for Local Currency and Foreign
Currency Ratings (the latter refers to the issuer’s overall
capacity to meet its foreign currency obligations).33 Anything
less than BBB (on the Standard & Poors scale) is not consid-
ered “investment grade.” Few emerging markets have invest-
ment grade ratings, and this obviously limits lenders’
willingness (or, for some institutions, their legal ability) to
take up bonds or syndications.
Water projects tend to fall in an awkward category from the
viewpoint of financing, too small to bear the overhead costs
of project finance, but too large to be funded from aid. The
relationship between country risk and project size, and the
implications for financing options, is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Project finance is generally available subject to a ‘de minimis’
size, which depends on the bank(s) and the project. A typical
minimum project size is $50–100 million. Below that level,
returns to scale generally tend to make project financing
uneconomic, and projects will have to be addressed by the
corporate sector. For project finance to be a viable option,
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project revenues and returns to equity must be acceptable,
though this does not preclude the use of aid to reduce the
debt or equity burden of the project.
As the creditworthiness of the host country/municipality
worsens, eventually a credit standing is reached where the
project will not be financeable without some political insur-
ance/guarantee. Then, as country creditworthiness worsens
further, projects will not be financeable under any circum-
stances because of the country rating and/or the lack of polit-
ical cover available. In Figure 3.1, there are projects of greater
than $50 million that will not be done because of the lack of
political cover. Similarly for sub-investment grade locations
(rated BB+ and below), there is a project size ($ 10,000 to $
100,000) too small for the corporate sector and too large for
aid or micro loans.
The area where projects will not get financed is described as
the Exposed Segment (coloured white). (Note that the dia-
gram has a logarithmic scale.) The Exposed Segment proba-
bly contains the majority of prospective projects—the range
$10 million to $50 million is a common size for water projects.
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Figure 3.1 Water projects segmentation, financing options
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General orientations
The panel has come to the following general conclusions,
which lie behind its proposals:
● Based on the various authoritative estimates of invest-
ment requirements to meet targets both for 2015 and
2025, there is clearly going to be a large gap between
current financial flows and the investment estimates. The
annual funds going into the sector as a whole would need
to roughly double. This is the benchmark to be kept per-
manently in mind. 
● No single source will be large enough to fill this gap
alone. There are various sources of funding for water, and
the sector will need them all. In practice, governments,
ODA donors and MFIs are currently the major funders of
investment. Cash flow from water revenues provides only
part most of recurrent costs (operation, maintenance,
repairs) and only rarely contributes to funding
investment.
● Global financial flows into water, after a slight increase
in the 1990s, have recently fallen to a very low point.
● Many central governments have not, in practice, been
giving high priority to the water sector, and need to
decide on a clear policy towards this sector. But as the
problem of water access and sanitation essentially lies at
grass-roots level, decentralisation of policies will be
crucial.
● The water sector badly needs reforming as a condition of
generating and absorbing increased funding from all
sources. This should be accompanied by a major effort at
building managerial and technical capacity, with help
from national and international peers. This should be a
priority for the use of donor and MFI funding. Without
reforms and capacity building, it will be a case of New
Wine into Old Bottles.
● Sustainable financing for water systems will require
greatly improved cost recovery from their users and
increased management efficiency. In many cases rev-
enues scarcely cover recurrent costs at present, and make
no contribution to investment. The situation is even
worse in public irrigation systems. Tariffs will need to rise
in many cases, but the flexible and imaginative use of tar-
geted subsidies to the truly poor will be called for to make
cost recovery acceptable, affordable, and so, sustainable. 
● On a positive note, the climate for official aid (ODA) is
now better than for some years, and with the new com-
mitments by a number of major donors, we can look for-
ward to a reversal of the recent downward trend. Donors
should be pressed to uphold their pledges and MFIs are
likewise urged to increase their lending. Even so, ODA
and MFI lending are not going to fill more than a minor
part of the funding gap, though it is most important for
the poorest countries. Aid flows need to be more care-
fully allocated to countries and target groups, and com-
bined with other types of finance to induce a larger total
flow from all sources. We are aware that this implies a
significant departure from prevailing methods in a num-
ber of donor cities.
● International commercial lending and equity investment
for emerging markets in general, and to water in partic-
ular, have been falling in recent years, and the prospects
remain poor. New ways of mitigating the risks of lending
and investment in the sector are urgently needed, and
existing facilities need to be used more fully.
● Private international investment in infrastructure has
been very selective, oriented far more towards energy,
transport and telecommunications than to water. Many
projects in the water sector, though initially successful,
have been beset by difficulties, especially currency crises
in such key countries as Indonesia, Philippines and
Argentina. In response to these and other problems, the
pool of potential international operators has shrunk and
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is now very small. The panel is convinced of the vital
importance of private sector disciplines, know-how and
management skills in the reform and further development
of the water sector. But it takes a pragmatic view of the
costs and benefits of private participation in each case. It
is aware that there are many different kinds of private
involvement. Whatever the form chosen, risks need to be
better allocated between the various parties and miti-
gated, using both existing and new methods.
● With revenues in the water sector almost entirely in local
currencies, it is sensible to finance the sector as far as pos-
sible using locally denominated funds, to minimise expo-
sure to currency changes. This calls for active measures to
develop local capital markets and funding sources. It also
implies that central governments should exercise special
restraint in order to avoid crowding out other borrowers
in the long-term credit markets.
● Much investment in water is made, and much more is
needed, at the grass-roots level, where the involvement
of individual users, small producers, community organi-
sations and NGOs is essential. These parties need to have
better access to finance. In many countries, local busi-
nesses are already involved as contractors and service
providers. Already tapping into local funding sources,
they would benefit from the further development of local
capital markets. 
● There is clear evidence that so far water has suffered from
a lack of financing, particularly at grass-roots and local
level, and a lack of monitoring at national and global level.
This calls, to a degree, for a “reversed financial architec-
ture,” though we should guard against the illusion that it
is possible to solve the problem by the creation of a global
world water fund. At this level, nevertheless, a “global
control tower” is needed, to provide information to a
group of independent observers to prompt adequate and
timely reactions.
The remainder of this chapter applies this philosophy to make
proposals for increasing funding for the water sector. There
are broadly two kinds of measures: governance and sector
reform, which are mainly within the powers of host govern-
ments and which create the right environment for attracting
more finance; actions the providers of funds and their coun-
terparts in the host countries can take. This section includes
specific financing proposals, which necessarily differ accord-
ing to the sector to which they apply (e.g. urban or rural).
Water governance and 
sector reform
This section starts by addressing what central governments
need to do to raise water higher on their policy agenda. It
dwells at greater length on the crucial role of “sub-sovereign”
entities as players in this sector and has numerous suggestions
for making them more powerful and effective. It urges the
importance of creating larger and more efficient local capital
markets and financial intermediaries. It also discusses key
cross-cutting issues—corruption, managerial capacity sus-
tainable cost recovery and legal and contractual aspects. 
Central governments
Central governments in developing countries need to take a
grip on the water sector by producing national strategies for
implementing the MDG targets and other water sector com-
mitments—and by inscribing water clearly in their PRSPs to
capture the benefits of debt reduction for this sector. The
PRSP is used increasingly by countries and their donors as a
centrepiece of poverty-reduction policies and as a vehicle for
targeting the local proceeds from coordinated international
debt reduction. So far, the water sector has not had the pri-
ority it deserves in these Papers, and in some cases does not
even feature.
Governments that rise to the challenge and genuinely give
water the priority it deserves should get financial bonuses
from the international community. Aid and multilateral lend-
ing should reward the countries that are “first off the block.”
● Each country should produce a national water policy and
plan, including specific programmes to meet the
Millennium targets and beyond. This would be detailed in
an action programme embedded in the national docu-
ment that countries committed themselves to produce at
the Johannesburg Earth Summit, and would be part of an
agreement for additional ODA for water.
● Countries should state indicators by which their efforts
should be judged.
● Each country should provide predictable revenue frame-
works to their water service providers, either public or
private.
● Each country should monitor and report annually their
achievements towards the WMDGs.
● For the Highly Indebted Poor Countries, water should be
explicitly included in national Poverty Reduction Strategy
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Papers, to give higher priority in national budgets and
capture some of the benefits of debt relief for this sector.
● Donors should keep funds available for rewarding coun-
tries that make early progress on implementation of
water programmes in meeting the MDGs.
● Governments should create an enabling environment for
the participation of the private sector in the delivery of
infrastructure services.
● Governments should adopt integrated water resources
management policies.
● Governments should encourage municipalities in large
and middle size cities to start working on projects for
water supply and sanitation with the aim of responding
rationally to the pressure of urbanisation.
● Governments should engage in active regional and inter-
national policies to address the problems of trans-bound-
ary rivers and basins.
Sub-sovereign entities
The sub-sovereign level of government has the greatest
potential to raise the quantity and quality of water services.
In most countries, local governments—or their public local
water authorities—are responsible for providing collective
water services. Where provision is inadequate, sub-sovereign
bodies can best identify local solutions, organise their imple-
mentation and manage distribution. There is a better chance
of good choices being made over the technology and level of
service being provided if the decisions are taken at a decen-
tralised level. Mistakes made over these crucial choices can
kill any hope of financial sustainability for the water service
providers concerned.
Sub-sovereign bodies can allow local participation, have a
thorough understanding of local problems and issues and
enable quick decisionmaking at the local level. An inclusive
government can energise local participation in building solu-
tions. The sub-sovereign can also handle a wide range of proj-
ect sizes, including the very small. But one of the main blocks
to progress in water is the sub-sovereigns’ lack of access to
money and lack of good management skills. 
First, sub-sovereigns must demonstrate the required breadth
of expertise in managerial and financial matters, and in budg-
etary and treasury management.
● Governments should be encouraged to procure training
and help for their sub-sovereigns in these areas. 
● Central governments should set national minimum stan-
dards for the provision of water sector services by their
sub-sovereigns.
● Governments, with sub-sovereigns as a group, should
define what technical and financial assistance sub-sover-
eigns require to meet these standards.
● In order to optimize local investment capacities local gov-
ernments and water authorities should maximize their
operating efficiency and report about their performance
in meeting these standards.
● The development of close contacts, including partner-
ships and associations, should be promoted between
sub-sovereigns, both nationally and regionally, to allow
exchanges of experience and best practice. This would
extend to the preparation of toolkits and possibly prepa-
ration of standardised documentation.
● Contracts for Private Sector Participation (PSP) should be
standardised and promoted, whereby sub-sovereigns can
employ private companies under incentive-driven con-
tracts to raise efficiency and performance.
Apart from good management, the creditworthiness of sub-
sovereign entities depends on tax revenues, flows from cen-
tral government, cash generation from the tariffs for existing
services, the income generated by new projects, capital and
operating expenditures and the levels of debt. Active munic-
ipal financiers give high credence to the concept of essen-
tiality. If taxpayers believe a project is necessary, they will be
much more willing to pay taxes and bear other financial bur-
dens, than if the project is considered inessential or even
frivolous.
Current problems include the inadequacies of the financial
statements prepared by sub-sovereigns, the secrecy of avail-
able numbers, poor auditing and poor oversight. A vicious cir-
cle exists in which sub-sovereigns are unwilling to prepare or
to open their books without seeing money on the table, and
lenders are unwilling to make any move before the informa-
tion is provided.
Budgetary support from central government is often a key
determinant of sub-sovereigns financial strength. Yet it is
common to find that the fiscal relationship between the cen-
tral government and its sub-sovereigns is ill-defined or
opaque. To the extent that this fiscal relationship is unclear,
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potential lenders will discount the uncertainty fully, leading
to higher costs and possibly withholding finance.
The panel recommends:
● Encourage central governments to provide incentives for
good reporting by their sub-sovereigns—say by relating
some central transfers to the quality of reporting. 
● Promote a central agency to collect, publish and compare
sub-sovereigns’ financial and management information
(including benchmarking of key operating parameters).
The agency should encourage civil society to monitor
whether the services received by the community are con-
sistent with the reports received. The panel recommends
that a small group of donors support such an agency,
using public and private sector expertise in administrative,
legal and financial areas.
● Encourage governments to define clearly their fiscal rela-
tionship with sub-sovereigns.
The short time horizon of some sub-sovereign officials (in
some countries mayors are elected for three years) increases
the likelihood of irresponsible behavior towards obligations
taken on by predecessors. It is important to build transparency
and to create incentives for good governance and disincen-
tives for bad.
● Governments, with the help of donors, should be asked
to promote the rating of sub-sovereigns, partly to enable
transparency and tracking behavior.
● Governments should make the activities of sub-sover-
eigns more transparent, for instance by giving represen-
tatives of civil society a voice and a role in such reporting.
In many countries there are restrictive limits on borrowing by
sub-sovereigns. Moreover many existing financial institutions
are either constrained in, or prevented from, lending to sub-
sovereigns. In many jurisdictions the legal basis for sub-sov-
ereign financing is weak or even hostile.
It is entirely justifiable for a central government to set limits
on the borrowing by sub-sovereigns, both in local currency
and certainly in foreign currencies, for such borrowing needs
to be within the sub-sovereigns’ and the national carrying
capacity. But in most domains this is taken to excess, and the
limits are set not in the general interest but with a tendency
to concentrate financial resources in the hands of the central
government. Because central governments are borrowers
themselves and tend to dominate domestic markets, they
view sub-sovereigns as competitors rather than partners.
While responsibility for infrastructure service provision has
been devolved to sub-sovereigns, corresponding access to
long-term credit markets has not.
This crowding out in domestic credit markets is achieved by a
range of rules and requirements, the most common being
instructions to banks, insurers and pension plans to hold a high
proportion of their reserves in treasury bonds. But it is also sup-
ported by the way the laws are written. It is not going to be
easy to persuade governments to make way for more sub-sov-
ereign borrowing for water, when those governments are
competing for the same funds. It will be essential to use effec-
tive persuasion to show governments the benefits of opening
doors, even partially, for more sub-sovereign financing. 
The position in domestic markets is mirrored by international
institutional arrangements. Several MFIs, though not all, are
constrained by their articles, or by the customary interpreta-
tion of their articles, from lending at the sub-sovereign level.
Moreover most export credit agencies also have severe restric-
tions on the credit they can grant against sub-sovereign risk.
These practices should be re-examined: it is vital to remove
the impediments to international lending institutions financ-
ing sub-sovereigns. In addition it would be helpful to focus
the extra marginal funds obtained from donors for water to
this specific area. It should, of course, be recognised that the
spread of more sub-sovereign lending will have implications
for the pricing of loans, which would need to reflect the credit
standing of the borrowers.
In principle, national development banks have a potentially
important role as intermediaries between foreign lenders,
central governments and sub-sovereign entities. A single
national organisation would be able to deal with foreign MFIs
and donors, and with local central government, given the
potentially large number of sub-sovereign bodies wishing to
borrow. The development banks would, over time, build up
experience and intelligence about borrowers in a way that is
not feasible for an external agency. If it worked on an appro-
priate scale, it could build up sector expertise and become an
important technical partner and mentor for water projects.
The bank would need to have the powers to recover loans in
the event of difficulties. But it would be in a position to pool
its risks from different borrowers. And investors, donors and
MFIs would be able to deal with a single “window” in each
country. 
Despite these potential advantages, in practice the perform-
ance of many national development banks has been poor, due
to inexperience and imprudent lending for political reasons.
Many have had to be refinanced by national governments and
central banks, drastically reformed, or even closed down.
Nevertheless, they are obvious types of intermediaries for sub-
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sovereign lending, and should be seriously considered, taking
full account of the lessons of previous experience.
● Governments should consider taking steps to permit the
prudent development of domestic borrowing markets for
sub-sovereigns. These groups would also promulgate
success stories in this area.
● Governments should encourage and facilitate the entry
of rating agencies and bond insurance/ financial guaran-
tee companies to their domestic capital markets.
● In the light of lessons learned from previous experience,
and with appropriately reforms made, national develop-
ment banks or specialised financial institutions should be
considered as intermediaries channeling external and cen-
tral government funds, and funds raised in local markets,
to sub-sovereign bodies operating in the water sector.
● Governments should encourage the creation of credit
pools for sub-sovereigns, with an option of joint and sev-
eral liability.34 This would give the sub-sovereigns them-
selves an interest in their peers’ self-governance.
● Governments should be encouraged to allow and facili-
tate limited intercepts into fiscal transfers to give lenders
to sub-sovereigns partial security.
Many water projects have long payback periods and high
externalities, so that it may be entirely appropriate to sub-
sidise them. In addition constraints on tariffs, such as those
paid by poor communities, may also provide economic and
as social justification for subsidies. Sub-sovereigns are ill
equipped to analyse and design such projects—and are badly
placed to obtain funds from international sources, which
mainly work through central governments.
● Donors should provide technical assistance to sub-sover-
eigns for analyzing and designing water projects.
● Donors should channel aid to sub-sovereigns requiring
funding on concessional terms for water projects.
● Sub-sovereign entities should consider the option of
retaining assets in public ownership, with continued pub-
lic responsibility for investment finance, and with opera-
tions privately financed and managed. 
The foregoing steps will expand the availability of finance,
partly by stimulating a response from private markets. But it
will be productive to set up a fund or a limited number of
regional funds to channel resources to sub-sovereigns. Since
sub-sovereign requirements for water are mainly in local cur-
rency, such funds should concentrate on partial guarantees,
bond insurance or other enhancements that could be used to
improve the credit quality of local currency instruments.
The need for subsidies also suggests that a fund may be
required. Some of the needs can be met by direct subsidies
from the sub-sovereign, central government, or aid donors,
or by appropriate public-private partnerships where risks and
costs are shared by the public sector. But it would also be
highly productive to form a subsidized fund, whereby finance
could be channeled to sub-sovereigns, for water sector proj-
ects, at costs below market (see below). 
Promoting local capital markets and savings
Revenues of the water sector are nearly always in local cur-
rency, so funds raised abroad, serviced and repayable in for-
eign currencies, expose the borrower or investor to a foreign
exchange risk. The panel was repeatedly told that this risk is
a serious disincentive to the entry of foreign loans or equity
to the water sector in emerging and developing countries. 
Some larger countries (e.g. India, China, Brazil and South
Africa, among others) have well established local capital mar-
kets, able to satisfy a good proportion of local borrowing
needs. These markets typically offer short-term loans, and
need to evolve a fuller range of long-term instruments to be
able to satisfy the needs of the water sector. But a high pro-
portion of their total debt is denominated in local currency and
immune to devaluation risk. However, access to local funding
sometimes remains difficult for instance in China, local fund-
ing being prohibited by law from financing acquisitions.
In the majority of countries, however, domestic banks and
other financial intermediaries are unable to satisfy the local
demand for secure savings outlets and sources of loans.
Water, as an infrastructure sector with a long repayment hori-
zon, has specific problems in attracting local capital, though
banks will take part in well-structured schemes, in which other
parties can provide the required overall length of maturity.
Active local development banks could attract local capital as
participants or investment partners. There is also a specific
value in using guarantees that effectively lengthen the term
of loans. In most countries, very few lenders are willing to go
beyond a term of a few years, too short for major water proj-
ects. But using a partial credit guarantee covering some of
the later repayments effectively stretches the loan term to
make it more appealing to borrowers. The partial risk guar-
antee can complement this by covering other repayment
risks. The two guarantees can lengthen the term and reduce
the interest spread on loans and bonds raised in local and for-
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eign markets. A number of international financial institutions
and bilateral agencies offer these products, but the conditions
for their implementation are not always met in a specific proj-
ect, due to the lack of a proper legal framework or clear shar-
ing of responsibilities between Central and Local Authorities.
Local pension funds and other institutional investors such as
mutual funds are potentially large sources of funding for
water projects.35 In a number of emerging markets pension
funds are likely to grow, starting from a modest base, and are
well placed to provide local currency funding, if the right sav-
ings instruments and security are available. Pension funds can
take a long view, and have a natural interest in long-term sav-
ings instruments, including those offering stable returns.
Because of their strong fiduciary commitment, pension funds
are limited in the risks they can take. But many of them would
be attracted to “socially responsible” investment outlets.36
Moreover, water has a reliable and consistent earnings stream
over the long term.
● For these reasons, the panel believes there is potential in
the MFIs’ use of instruments such as Partial Credit
Guarantees and their efforts to raise more bonds in local
currency. These activities encourage the growth of local
currency markets, increase the supply of funds for the
water sector and strengthen balance sheets of the pen-
sion funds through building a better currency and
asset/liability match for the local savings. Some MFIs are
also now offering long term fixed interest rate local cur-
rency loans, and local currency swaps. These initiatives
should also be encouraged and expanded.
● Governments and central banks should put in place meas-
ures to promote local capital markets and address prob-
lems caused by their own actions in ‘crowding out’ other
borrowers.
International financial institutions and other agencies extend
their use of partial credit and partial risk guarantees to pro-
mote local capital markets and encourage the use of local
pension funds in the water sector—and urgently address
statutory and managerial obstacles to their further use for this
purpose.
Sustainable cost recovery
Increasing the resource mobilisation for water must start with
closing the revenue cycle. Only operators or water authorities
that generate sufficient cash can operate and maintain pres-
ent systems and attract investments for expanding services
and improving management. Water services and manage-
ment are always paid for by someone—inevitably consumers
(through user tariffs) or taxpayers (from fiscal resources) or to
a much smaller extent by bilateral and multilateral assistance.
Closing the revenue cycle depends on both reducing costs
and increasing revenues. 
At present, it is common for the revenue from water tariffs to
cover only part of the recurrent costs of urban household
water services. It is rare for tariff revenues to contribute to
capital expenses in municipal schemes. As long as this situa-
tion persists, water authorities depend on subsidies to cover
part of their recurrent costs and virtually all their capital
spending on expansion and modernisation. Budgetary con-
straints are a chronic brake on the sector, and water author-
ities slip into an attitude of dependency on central
government and aid funding. They cannot develop long-term
plans. It is also wrong to think that tax revenues are a more
obvious source than tariffs, in poor countries with weak fis-
cal systems and many other urgent claims on the public purse.
For water supply and sanitation, the panel believes that full
cost recovery from users is the ideal long-term aim. However,
it recognises that there are situations where full cost recovery
is not feasible, or even desirable, in the foreseeable future.
The situation of large, affluent cities is clearly different from
that of scattered and poor rural settlements. Families already
in the cash economy are better placed to pay than those still
outside it. People coming into a public system for the first time
may need special encouragement through subsidies. The
device of cross-subsidies to households from other sectors, or
from more affluent consumers, is not available in systems
where the majority of users are poor. Some countries have
chosen to supply each consumer with a free basic quota of
water. In these and other cases, public subsidies may continue
to be part of the financing solution.
The panel therefore proposes the concept of sustainable cost
recovery as a way of giving the water sector the financial
assurance it needs, while acknowledging affordability prob-
lems and the case for subsidies in certain cases. It proposes
that the aim of water service providers should be sustainable
cost recovery, which means that:
● Service providers should aim for revenues sufficient to
cover their recurrent costs, and they should develop sus-
tainable long-term cost recovery policies, anticipating all
future cash flow needs. Sustainable cost recovery includes
operating and financing costs as well as the cost of
renewing existing infrastructure. 
● Revenues arising from charges should be covered by users
as a group. Under sustainable cost recovery, not all users
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need pay the same price. Individual affordability of water
charges should be ensured by appropriate tariff struc-
tures including local cross-subsidisation (for example, by
setting a rising block tariff structure) and/or by individu-
ally targeted and transparent pro-poor policies.
● The part of recurrent revenues provided by taxpayers
from public budgets should be secured by agreeing well
in advance to the allocation of sufficient fiscal transfers. 
From experience of tariff reforms, raising revenue creates a
“virtuous circle” leading to improvements in service, expan-
sion of the system creating further revenues, attraction of
external funding and investment, and releasing public funds
for those purposes that genuinely need subsidising. The
panel has been repeatedly told that even poor urban people
are willing to pay for water, though politicians are often
reluctant to charge them higher tariffs. Affordability, and
ways of achieving it, are the keys to charging adequate
tariffs. 
One rule of thumb that is useful in some cases (e.g. planning
water supply in Asian cities) is that urban households are able
to afford to pay up to 5% of their incomes on water serv-
ices.37 Intelligent tariff design is fundamental. It is well known
that poor people, without their own connections, buy from
vendors or neighbours at many times the price per unit that
is paid by those with connections. But this is usually for small
quantities of water, and, once connected, poor families may
need relief from paying the full tariffs. Realistically, there will
be systems  (in poor, isolated or rural communities) where
affordability is a distant prospect and some subsidy inevitable,
at least in the short term. 
Sustainable cost recovery must therefore allow for wide vari-
ations in payment capacity. It is useful to distinguish urban,
peri-urban and rural consumers. Many urban utilities offer
the promise of complete cost recovery for water supply sys-
tems but most peri-urban often require their investment costs
to be subsidised. When they are served by a large utility,
cross-subsidies are feasible and will not threaten the utility’s
financial sustainability. Many rural water supply and sanita-
tion systems are unlikely to recover more than a portion of
investment costs, in addition to paying for operations and
maintenance costs, which is a minimum for ensuring sus-
tainability of operations.
There are various ways of using subsidies, but the general
principles are that they should be affordable (general budg-
ets are adequate to support them), targeted to the groups
intended to benefit, and transparent (visible to the public and
identifiable in public accounts). 
Where they are available, social security payments can sub-
sidise the water bills of poor families and other deserving
cases (this is the system operated to good effect in Chile).
Cross-subsidy is another option, using higher rates paid by
consumers in other sectors (such as industry) to lower rates
paid by the poor. A common device is to use a stepped (pro-
gressive) tariff, with the initial amounts free or cheap, fol-
lowed by higher unit tariffs for larger amounts of
consumption (though this would not help large families). In
some countries, a free basic ration is provided, underwritten
in the last resort by the government. A highly efficient way
of subsidising the poor is to give them connections at a sub-
sidised cost that they can afford. Where subsidies are used to
cover the transition to full cost-recovering tariffs, they should
be tapering. 
● Where subsidies are used they should be targeted, trans-
parent and, where they are intended to ease the transi-
tion to higher tariffs, tapering.
Where public subsidies form an important part of water rev-
enues, they should be agreed to far enough in advance to
give the water authorities the assurance they need to plan
their future operations and investment plans (water projects
often take many years in gestation). Many governments can-
not give such assurances for future years, and in such cases
it is wise for the water sector to be as financially self-reliant
as possible. It is an obvious point that governments that
decide to subsidise water need to have credible fiscal policies.
Increasing managerial capacity 
Many of the water sector’s problems originate in its weak
organisations, which often reflect the wider political, admin-
istrative and financial problems of the societies in which they
operate. Waiting to solve these problems, and making good
governance a precondition of further international support to
the water sector, would make the Millennium timetable unat-
tainable and abandon many of its intended beneficiaries to
their fate. The panel’s proposals on strengthening sub-sover-
eign bodies, helping local communities, developing contrac-
tual capacity and the like will all help the cause of capacity
building. But they do not satisfy the need for better per-
formance of government in its core responsibilities, the
urgency of which was repeatedly brought home to the panel.
The report has called for national water strategies to be pro-
duced, as the means of defining and implementing a water
policy. It cites competent and independent regulators and
supervisors as necessary when delegating to sub-sovereigns
and semi-public bodies, and when considering private par-
ticipation. Technical assistance for capacity-building in public
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administrations has a long history—of not being particularly
effective. Nor is it very popular with donors, who find it diffi-
cult to attach a clear national identity (a “flag”) to this type
of aid. It is much easier to raise large sums of ODA for capi-
tal investments than to raise tiny sums for the administrative
capacity building so vital for making investments effective.
Even so, the panel believes that it is of extreme importance to
strengthen the skills of managers dealing with water issues in
public authorities, at the government, municipal or commu-
nity levels.
● Funding for capacity development in water-related insti-
tutions at government, municipal and community levels
should be a high priority for the use of ODA and MFI
funds. 
● Donors should finance trust funds in the MFIs for using
specialists with strong practical experience at the appro-
priate level in the transfer of skills.
With 97% of the population of poor and emerging countries
at least notionally served by public utilities, the panel believes
that it is not only essential to train the managers in the pub-
lic authorities that regulate the utilities but also to attract and
train good managers inside the public utilities themselves. The
panel is attracted to cooperation agreements—between pub-
lic authorities as well as utilities on both sides—that define
clearly the respective roles of the “advisor” and of the “recip-
ient” bodies. The panel recommends using the decentralised
nature of water supply as an opportunity for healthy compe-
tition among public, private and community-based solutions.
The involvement of reputable public institutions, from other
parts of the country or abroad, could greatly strengthen core
bodies and improve the governance of the sector. Traditional
“twinning” arrangements have had limited success, mainly
because the arrangements lacked any real incentives or gen-
uine commitment from the two parties. Recent “reinforced
twinning” arrangements have introduced stronger incentives
(between the Nordic cities and those in the Baltic states and
Russia). This is an example of “decentralised cooperation”.
The panel recommends donors to give grants and technical
assistance in support of these cooperation agreements
● Donors should support cooperation agreements involving
experienced and reputable public partners, as a means of
strengthening core public capacities. These agreements
should state mutual responsibilities and contain perform-
ance targets and incentives applying to both parties.
The panel believes that most effective learning happens “on
the job”, in “learning by doing”. Organisations and people
within them learn best when they work on problems jointly
with more experienced colleagues and partners. South-South
cooperation (between countries at a similar level of develop-
ment or cultural background) is often cost-effective. This kind
of assistance will need grant funding, allowing contributions
to be matched flexibly and in a timely manner to specific
requirements. 
● The panel recommends the concept of jointly working on
problems and “learning while doing” in public-public
partnerships as well as in cooperation agreements
between utilities and companies. Such cooperation is pos-
sible either within a country, or in a North-South or South-
South38 manner.
Learning while doing is also relevant to improved project
preparation through the concept of “action planning”. For
example, within an approved investment programme, capac-
ity building should start early, even during the planning
process. For this to happen, some funding has to be available
before project preparation is completed and before the final
loan or management contract is signed. This preliminary
funding may later be consolidated in the contract agree-
ment—or it could be provided, possibly together with capac-
ity development services, from development agencies
specialising in this. Local partners would gain experience and
credibility in the planning process, and increase their sense of
“ownership” of the project. It would also reduce the lead
time entailed in major investments and alleviate the severe
strain most administrations will experience as they try to meet
the MDG targets39. 
● In pursuing the MDG targets donors should support
“action planning”, in which planning and project prepa-
ration are wrapped into aid projects. 
The collection and publication of comparative performance
data for different water authorities is an important spur to
improving performance (as in the AsDB’s Water Utilities Data
Book and the African Water Utility Partnership’s benchmark-
ing project). Water managers can draw on existing networks
of water professionals, meeting regularly to exchange expe-
rience in gatherings organised by the International Water
Association and its regional counterparts (such as the Union
Africaine des Distributeurs d’Eau or the Asociacion
Interamericana de Ingenieria Sanitaria y Ambiental). The
efforts of these associations in organising training courses
and benchmarking surveys deserve recognition and support. 
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● ODA should be provided for the work of regional profes-
sional associations in support of training, professional
exchanges, and data collection and benchmarking.
Another field of application of “learning while doing” is the
preparation and implementation of contracts through such
schemes as Build Operate Transfer (BOT), Design Build
Finance Operate (DBFO), Build Own Operate (BOO), conces-
sions and O & M contracts. These kinds of contract all involve
important transfers of skills from private to public partners.
This kind of on-the-job approach to learning is usually very
effective. 
● ODA technical cooperation should be used to help in the
preparation, structuring and implementation of contracts
such as BOT and other kinds of concession, operation &
maintenance contracts, management contracts and
leases, as a means of enhancing on-the-job capacity
building.
Corruption and ethical practices
Corruption can arise among public and private, local and
international participants in the water sector. It distorts proj-
ects, damages the operating environment and discourages
responsible investors. Eradicating it, especially from societies
where it is endemic will not be easy. The panel’s proposals on
sub-sovereign entities, contracts, and other matters will con-
tribute to institutional reform, better administration, trans-
parency and more open and rigorous commercial practices. 
● Capacity development in the core public institutions of
the water sector should aim to define and implement a
water policy, set a regulatory framework and create a
basis for commissioning and controlling executing work,
whether performed by private or public agents. 
● Executing agencies should be made attractive for high-
calibre leadership, accountable for performance and
delivery. Integrity standards should be worked out coop-
eratively by all interested parties.
● The decentralised nature of water services is an opportu-
nity for different mixes of public, private and self-help
options, and for competition between them. The choice
among them should be pragmatic, eschewing ideology.
● The high political profile of water should be used posi-
tively to create more transparency for its operations.
Public opinion, user associations and NGOs should be
encouraged to monitor and publicise the activities of
water organisations and expose corrupt practices.
Multinational companies involved in water ventures are pre-
occupied by urgent concerns affecting their further engage-
ment in the sector. Against this background, the efforts to
involve them in exercises like Transparency International’s
Integrity Pact or work on joint ethical standards for the sec-
tor has made little progress. The same is true, though for dif-
ferent reasons, of contractors and consultants in the water
sector. The outlook may change with a more favourable
international financial outlook and with measures to miti-
gate foreign exchange and other risks. Private companies are
urged, in their self-interest, to engage in the development of
ethical standards of behaviour for the water sector. The
panel has noted with appreciation the contribution of NGOs,
such as Transparency International, in assisting with these
efforts.
None of the above implies that corruption is absent in public
sector contractors, or that the problem is worse in private
companies. Both private and public contractors are urged to
develop codes and standards that place their behaviour
above reproach.
● Political obstacles to private sector participation in water
exist. One of these is a perception of corruption in some
previous dealings. Companies engaged in the water sec-
tor are urged to cooperate with other parties involved to
develop methods for promoting ethical behaviour. Public
water authorities and public sector contractors also need
to develop codes and standards that place their behav-
iour above reproach. Private participation transactions
should be made more transparent—for example,
through competitive bidding and including requirements
to publish contracts. 
The legal and regulatory environment
Despite the evident importance of new investment in the
water sector, very few new sound projects are presented to
potential investors and financiers, public or private. In the cur-
rent international economic climate, even fewer are likely to
come forward unless action is taken to increase the pipeline
of good, well-prepared projects, which is essential to meet
the challenge of global urbanisation. Only better structured
projects, meaning those with a better and clearly defined risk
allocation and with efficiently managed tendering and trans-
actional processes, would increase long-term investment in
the water sector, by both public and private sectors. 
The panel agrees that an adequate legal and regulatory
framework is a pre-condition for attracting more commercial
finance or private investment. In brief, the legal framework
should permit the matrix of rights and obligations that make
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up a bankable project and its commercial and funding struc-
ture to be confidently put in place, with the assurance that
relevant contracts will be enforceable in accord with their
terms. 
A major problem faced by international investors in water
projects is the risk of renegotiating of the contract during the
life of the public-private partnership. Removing weaknesses
of the tendering process and procedures, and improving their
transparency, would reduce the risk of project failure, often
caused by overbidding and underbidding, due to inadequate
information about the project at the tender stage.
Effective laws on the central-local fiscal relationship would
allow the interception of central-periphery fiscal transfers.
Their use as collateral would greatly enhance the financeabilty
of water infrastructure projects (Mexico is an example of the
use of central-periphery transfer funds as project security).
Moreover, effective laws on private financing of public infra-
structures could facilitate the “pooling” of several public bor-
rowers—which by jointly and severally guaranteeing each
other’s financial obligations, could greatly reduce the cost of
borrowing or even make the borrowing possible in the first
place.
Achieving a sound general legal framework will not be done
overnight. While urging the wider adoption of measures
based on best practice, the panel proposes a more modest
contribution, focusing on two related aspects: creating of a
fund or funds to be used for complex tendering, and study-
ing the practicality of producing a handbook of best practice
and model clauses for public-private partnerships.
The panel recommends:
● The creation of a Revolving Fund or funds consisting of
grant money to finance the preparation and structuring
costs of complex projects (including private sector partic-
ipation and other innovative structures). The fund would
be used to cover the legal, financial and technical advi-
sory costs of the preparation and structuring of projects
up to and including the tendering and negotiation
phases. 
The Fund would be replenished, partly or totally, by the pub-
lic partner on the award of the project to the successful bid-
der. If a project were cancelled, all or an appropriate amount
of the grant would be reimbursed to the Fund by the public
institutions in charge of the development of the project.
Although the Fund would be available equally for projects
implemented by the public and private sector, it would have
a particular impact on the attraction of private partners, now
an objective of many governments. 
Although other funds for helping project preparation exist,
this one would be dedicated to the water sector. In general,
donor governments and development agencies are reluctant
to finance technical assistance of this type, so the Fund would
fill a gap in the current structure of development finance.40
A second proposal aims to streamline the approach to pub-
lic-private infrastructure projects, currently one of the most
problematic, time-consuming and costly aspects of commer-
cial law. The panel recommends that:
● A study should be funded for the preparation of best
practice and model clauses in the legal agreements of
public-private partnerships, with particular reference to
the water sector. The panel wishes to draw the attention
of relevant institutions to the urgent need for this
initiative.41
Financial instruments and facilities
This section deals with methods of increasing external finan-
cial flows into water, organised according to the main sources
of these funds (internally generated and other domestic
sources are dealt with in the previous section). 
Official development assistance (ODA)
Official development assistance (ODA) comprises financial
transfers with a minimum grant element of 25% as stipulated
by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (“DAC”).
Commonly known as “aid”, most of it consists of govern-
ment-to-government transfers from OECD member states,
so-called “bilateral” aid. A minor, but still substantial portion
is “multilateral” ODA from the World Bank’s International
Development Association (IDA), the concessional funds oper-
ated by the regional development banks, the various aid
funds of the European Union and several UN agencies includ-
ing the UN Development Programme (UNDP).
The multilateral development agencies mentioned above also
lend large amounts of “non-concessional” funds at near-
market rates. Although this is not ODA in the literal DAC
sense, it is available on more attractive terms than commer-
cial finance from banks and other lenders. In this report,
unless otherwise specified, references to ODA in general, or
proposals to increase ODA for water projects, improved gov-
ernance and capacity building are directed both at bilateral
and multilateral sources, including the non-concessional
lending of the MFIs. We return to the MFIs again in the next
section to discuss specific features of their operations.
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There are also bilateral agencies having a development pur-
pose but with more commercial practices, offering equity,
guarantees and/or loans at, or close to, market terms (the
German KFW, the French AFD, the UK’s CDC, the Japanese
JBIC and others). They have much in common with the MFIs
(section 5.3.2). 
ODA for the water sector has been declining in recent years,
partly because of the general decline of aid, partly because
of the sharp drop in aid for large dams and water storage
schemes. The prospects for a reversal of this trend have
recently improved. With the Monterrey Consensus, the
decline in ODA should be reversed—and it should increase by
25%—or $12.5 billion—by 2006. G8 leaders also declared in
Kananaskis that they believed “that in aggregate half or more
of our new ODA could be directed to African nations that
govern justly, invest in their own people and promote eco-
nomic freedom...this will help ensure that no country gen-
uinely committed to poverty reduction, good governance and
economic reform will be denied the chance to achieve the
Millennium Goals through lack of finance.” 
If implemented, such commitments, even if insufficient in
their amounts, could nevertheless have a decisive role in
catalysing more sizeable public and private financing over the
next few years. But a special effort should be made in the
water sector, where the proportion of aid remains low. In
constant dollars, DAC members’ bilateral aid to the water
sector increased over two decades at an annual average of
9%. The downward trend since the middle of the 1990s is a
reflection of ODA in general, although aid to water started
decreasing later than that of other sectors. 
The share of aid to water supply and sanitation in total ODA
remained relatively stable in the 1990s at 6% of bilateral and
4–5% of multilateral ODA. In recent years, total aid alloca-
tions to the water sector have averaged about $3 billion a
year. An additional $1–1.5 billion a year is allocated to the
water sector in the form of non-concessional lending by the
major MFIs. Japan is by far the largest donor in the sector in
value terms, accounting for about one-third of total aid to
water. Funding by IDA, Germany, the United States, France,
the United Kingdom and the European Commission amount
to another 44% of the total.
The 1998 DAC Development Cooperation Report showed
that aid in the water sector was highly concentrated in a rel-
atively small number of recipient countries. In 1995–96, for
example, nearly two-thirds of total aid to the water sector
was allocated to only 10 recipients. The data show broaden-
ing in focus in recent years. In 1997–2001 the 10 largest
recipients received 48% of total aid to the water sector.
China, India, Vietnam, Peru, Morocco and Egypt remained on
the top ten list. Turkey, Indonesia, Tunisia and Sri Lanka were
replaced by Mexico, Malaysia, Jordan and Palestinian admin-
istered areas.
Another finding of the 1998 analysis was that many coun-
tries with a large proportion of the population not having
access to safe water received very little, if any, aid to this sec-
tor. This still seems to be the case. Only 12% of total aid to
the water sector in 2000–01 was allocated to countries where
less than 60% of the population had access to an improved
water source, which includes most of the least developed
countries.
● Governments of developed countries should be held to
account for their commitments to increase aid to the
water sector. Overall ODA for water should be doubled,
as a first step. 
● Individual donors should contribute their share towards
this target, depending on the size of their current aid to
the water sector. This ODA increase should preferably be
done by increasing the amounts of grants. Donors and
MFIs should aim to make substantial increases in the
share of water in their total commitments.
These decisions should be seen as a clear demonstration of
the strength of commitment of the OECD countries to con-
tribute their own share for the implementation of the water
MDGs. But in view of the huge magnitude of the needs—par-
ticularly for rural populations—and of the very low level of
the present contributions to this sector, this doubling can only
be considered as a first step. If the other forms of support we
suggest materialise promptly—particularly in governance,
training local managers, preparing projects—higher amounts
of ODA will need to be considered. Once systems are
reformed as suggested, the investment of these resources
could contribute much more effectively to achieving the
MDG. 
To ensure that these quantitative efforts make a major dif-
ference, we expect that the increase in ODA will have to go
alongside ways of increasing its effectiveness.
● Donor agencies should work, under the guidance of the
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, to imple-
ment the DAC’s recommendations on increasing the
effectiveness of aid. They should aim to coordinate their
efforts in this sector, and avoid the waste and fragmen-
tation typical of earlier water programmes. 
Even if the ODA for water doubled, and its effective use could
be assured, there could be problems in matching the annual
amounts available with actual requirements. There could also
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be serious time lags before the flow of funds reached the
required levels. 
● In view of the capital-intensive nature of water invest-
ments, and the need for front-loading of ODA, means
should be found for governments to create a special
national or international facility to pre-finance disburse-
ments budgeted for a later period. 
In view if the quality of the signature of the OECD countries,
such a facility would benefit from AAA rating, and would
enable more ODA financing to be provided at the most criti-
cal moment for the achievement of our goals. The panel has
been encouraged to hear that suggestions of a similar nature
are being presented by the Chancellor of Exchequer for con-
sideration by the G8 countries. We strongly support their
adoption.
There is a risk, and the panel is sensitive to it, that a major
increase in the availability of grant aid for water projects
would “crowd out” commercial lending and discourage
water authorities from becoming more financially self-sus-
taining. Hence the importance of using aid to facilitate other
flows, instead of replacing them. This requires judgment in
each case, but it would be helpful for donors to operate only
within coherent national water strategies, and they should
use ODA to influence reform of water institutions to improve
their commercial and financial autonomy. 
● Rather than funding entire projects or programmes
through grants, with the risk of smothering local initia-
tives and discouraging financial self-sufficiency, donors
should regard their funds as catalysts to mobilise other
flows and empower other players.
Another method of generating more resources for the water
sector is through “debt for water” swaps. 
● The panel encourages the parties involved to enter into
“debt for water” swaps as a means of increasing local
currency funds available for water projects.
We also call the attention of OECD governments to the fact
that the significant efforts we suggest in the field of guaran-
tees deserve to be properly reflected alongside other forms of
official assistance, in the ODA statistics of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC). The current reporting conven-
tions reflect guarantees only when they give rise to actual dis-
bursements—for instance, after default. We believe that this
does not fully reflect the real size of the contingent liabilities
accepted at a given moment by a donor country. 
● We invite the DAC to consider amending its presentations
of national ODA performance to reflect properly the sta-
tus of guarantees.
MAKING BETTER USE OF ODA
Despite this welcome prospect, extra aid will finance only a
minor part of the increased funds required. It is important to
make the best use of it by focusing it both geographically and
within certain parts of the water sector. It should also be used
to back certain important multilateral initiatives.
● Geographically, ODA should favour countries, especially
in Africa, where the water service deficit is greatest and
where most remains to be done to meet the water MDG
targets. 
● Within countries, grant ODA for water and sanitation
should be directed to regions, settlements and social
groups where public subsidy is necessary. 
● Within the water sector, ODA should also be used for
services that have to be financed publicly because it is not
feasible to provide them privately, such as water resource
management, large water storage schemes, flood con-
trol, capacity building and major irrigation and drainage
projects. 
● Bilateral ODA should be applied in support of various cur-
rent important multilateral initiatives, such as the African
Water Initiative, AfDB’s Rural Water Supply and
Sanitation Initiative and the FAO’s Special Programme of
Food Security, among others.
The Panel would like to commend the African Development
Bank initiative (see annex 2) which addresses squarely and
convincingly the difficult issue of the partnership for water at
grass-roots level and which aims to catalyse the neccessary
joint action of governments, local municipalities, communi-
ties and NGOs as providers of finance and technical assis-
tance. The African Development Bank would also be the
channel for donor grant support. Other regional development
banks could consider, if appropriate, adopting similar
schemes.
Aid should be applied imaginatively and creatively alongside
other sources of funds, such as local revenues, voluntary
donations, bank loans and private capital—to leverage the
maximum total financial flows for this sector. It is important
for transparency and accountability purposes that the bene-
fits of aid should be clearly targeted to the beneficiary groups,
and that the association of aid with private funds clearly pro-
vides public benefits. There are several ways this can be done.
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First, aid can cover the initial overhead costs of the host
organisations for creating institutions and preparing projects.
This could include providing “seed capital” or equity for
revolving funds, replenished from user charges or other
sources.
Second, ODA can be used to provide guarantees, for a fee,
against some of the key risks in the water sector. 
Third, attracting much interest, is “output-based” aid, given
in association with commercial finance for infrastructure
services, carefully targeting the subsidy payments to speci-
fied works or social services actually provided. This kind of
aid can also be used to target the poor more accurately42
(Box 4.1.).
The panel recommends:
● Aid should be used to catalyse other financial flows by
such means as funding initial overhead costs, providing
equity for revolving funds, guarantees, and subsidies tar-
geted to performance (such as output-based aid).
● Donors should report annually about the impact of their
aid on achieving the water MDGs by publishing:
• The number of people they have helped to get access
to water and sanitation. 
• The average “aid efficiency” of their water project: the
above number of people divided by the grant value of
their aid.
• The “leverage effect” of their aid: namely, the total
amount of financing mobilised on water projects they
have aided.
Multilateral financial Institutions (MFIs)44
MFIs are important funders of water, through their grants,
loans and guarantees. Their track record is commendable and
they have great potential to do more. Although their loans
cover only a minor part of current investment needs, they set
the tone for others through their dialogues with government
recipients and the understandings they reach. They can also
mitigate risks for other players. They could lend more with-
out a proportionate increase in their borrowings or callable
capital, if certain of their constraints were relaxed.
The Panel is of the view that the MFI contribution will be cen-
tral in the overall strategy to provide the needed financing
where it is still missing, particularly at the most decentralised
level. This problem is so acute that it calls for a reversal of the
financial architecture. This concern lies behind several of the
following proposals and it explains in particular our strong
support for the implementation of the African Development
Bank’s “Rural water supply and sanitation initiative” and our
invitation to other regional development banks to follow suit.
As a strategic choice, we encourage the important new ori-
entations the World Bank Group is undertaking. 
● We recommend that, so far as possible, new instru-
ments should be located in and coordinated by the
regional development banks, which are in close touch
with regional water policies and which can maintain
links with communities and have an awareness of local
circumstances. 
Lending more to water implies lending more to sub-sovereign
entities who cannot avail themselves of a government guar-
antee. A number of the MFIs are barred, or bar themselves,
from lending without a sovereign guarantee. More recently
established MFIs (such as the EBRD) have no such limitation.
The panel has no wish to encourage MFIs to exceed prudent
lending and encourage excessive borrowing by weak sub-
sovereign bodies. But, equally, it urges MFIs to equip them-
selves to lend to such bodies where it is prudent, appropriate
and within their mission to do so. This may in some cases
involve a revision of their constitution, but is more likely to
entail managerial and board decisions to reinterpret existing
statutes and practice.
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Output-based aid (OBA) is a strategy for providing subsidies to support
the delivery of water and other basic services. In essence, it ties the dis-
bursement of public funding (whether sourced from government
resources, bilateral donors, or multilateral agencies) to specific services
or other outputs delivered by private firms or NGOs. This contrasts with
traditional approaches of directing public funding to pipes, pumps, or
treatment plants or other inputs used by public sector providers. 
Output-based aid has four main applications in the water sector. It can
be used for on-going consumption subsidies, as in Chile, where subsi-
dies are used to reimburse water bills of the target group of low-income
consumers. It can be used to support the expansion of existing water or
sewer networks, such as when disbursement of the funding is tied to
the number of new connections made and served. It can be used to
implement time bound subsidies to ease the transition to cost-covering
tariffs. Or disbursement of subsidies can be tied to the achievement of
specific environmental targets (such as the volume of wastewater
treated to a certain standard). All four approaches promise better tar-
geting of intended beneficiaries or outcomes, sharpen accountability for
results, improve incentives for efficiency and help to mobilise private
finance in support of development objectives. 
The World Bank launched its pilot output-based aid program in 2002, and
is currently working on pilot projects in the water sector in several regions.
A Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid was launched in 2003 to facil-
itate collaboration on OBA issues with other official agencies.
Box 4.1 Output-based aid43
● MFIs that do not now lend to sub-sovereign entities
should reconsider their policies, with the aim of permit-
ting such lending subject to normal prudential criteria.
The panel is strongly of the belief that one of the most impor-
tant ways in which MFIs can increase funding for water is
through the much greater use of their guarantee pro-
grammes to leverage other kinds of finance45. But this would
call for changes in MFIs’ policies on the way guarantees are
“scored.” One issue is “provisioning”, the way in which loans
and other instruments are treated as potential calls on
reserves and capital. The panel understands that guarantees,
and other types of contingency instruments, are treated on
fully the same basis as loans, in other words as if a guarantee
were loan exposure for 100% of the amount. This discour-
ages the use of guarantees. The panel believes it is important
to change these practices, if the MFIs are to fulfil their impor-
tant potential role in this sector.
● MFIs should revise their policies on capital provisioning,
where these are undue constraints on the use of
guarantees.
Guarantees are important credit enhancement instruments
that MFIs use to facilitate the flow of long-term debt, local
and foreign, to fund water infrastructure. Flexibility is needed
for the effective use of these instruments. Most MFIs are able
to issue guarantees on a standalone basis. But some others
are constrained by their articles, limiting their guarantees to
loans in which they participate. Such participation require-
ments complicates the structuring of financing transactions
since the MFI concerned has to make a direct loan to the bor-
rower even if a guarantee is all that is required.
● Those MFIs subject to the participation requirement
should consider amending their articles to enable them to
have the freedom to issue guarantees on a standalone
basis. 
FINANCING MAJOR HYDRAULIC WORKS
In the 1990s there was a backlash against the construction of
dams, reservoirs, water transfer schemes and other major
hydraulic works. Criticisms were based on the distress and
costs imposed on resettled populations, the adverse environ-
mental impact of the structures, widespread cost overruns
and the disappointing outcomes of many of these projects.
Much more rigorous and exhaustive procedures and stan-
dards have been urged on the sponsors and funders of dams
in particular. 
The practical effect of this hardening of attitude has been the
virtual cessation of lending by the World Bank and IADB for
dams and associated irrigation projects, a decline in lending
by the AsDB and AfDB, and a decline in interventions by the
bilateral donors. This has been particularly serious for smaller
or poorer countries, which are normally more dependent on
ODA and MFI funding. Those developing countries that could
afford it have continued to plan and build such schemes
under their own efforts, without the benefit of aid and MFI
advice and assistance, and often with lesser environmental
and social standards than would otherwise have been
applied. Some countries, especially in Africa, where the need
for storage is most urgent, have endured crucial delays in
projects and postponement of urgent works due to lack of
financial support.
The panel recognises the force of many of the criticisms, but
believes that the pendulum has swung too far in the other
direction. The reaction to dams appears to have been exces-
sive and counter-productive. A resumption of aid and MFI
lending to water storage and related projects, subject to ade-
quate social and environmental safeguards, is called for to
meet the future needs for water storage, flood control and
irrigation development. Africa, in particular, is grossly under-
provided for in this respect, and suffers the extremes of
drought and flood as a result. In many places water availabil-
ity is decreasing because of depletion or pollution of under-
ground watertables (due to climate change, lack of protection
or overabstraction). In many areas, achieving the water MDGs
in a sustainable way will require restoring watertables and
creating underground storage 
A reengagement in this sector by MFIs and donors would be
welcomed by authorities and beneficiaries in the recipient
countries. A positive sign of the tide turning was the com-
mitment by the World Bank in its Water Resources Strategy
for a reengagement with this kind of “high-risk/high-reward”
infrastructure and the preparation of “a new business model
which puts development risk first, and which aims at timely,
predictable and transparent decisions”46.
● MFIs and donors should resume lending to essential sur-
face and underground water storage projects, subject to
adequate social and environmental safeguards.
International commercial lending 
There are various categories of international commercial lend-
ing, whether bank loans or bonds. Sovereign loans and bond
issues are made against a guarantee of the government of the
host country. Commercial lending to utility projects falls into
two broad categories: recourse and non-recourse. Recourse
lending implies lending to companies or corporations which
then choose to invest in projects, the risk remaining with the
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borrower: that is, the corporation. Non-recourse lending, also
known as project finance, involves lending to a special purpose
vehicle with no or limited recourse back to the parent company
which may be a sponsor of, or shareholder to, the vehicle.
In the case of sovereign loans and recourse loans to corpo-
rate borrowers, the funds will not generally be earmarked for
specific projects or sectors such as water. Such full recourse
loans have the attraction of being simpler and quicker to
place than non-recourse, project finance loans. The draw-
backs may outweigh the benefits, however. Changing prior-
ities mean that funds are sometimes spent elsewhere. There
may be constraints of balance sheet capacity—de facto lim-
its on corporate gearing or not wanting to place unwanted
risk or liabilities on the balance sheet. Then there is the diffi-
culty in accommodating partners or sponsors of entirely dif-
ferent creditworthiness.
PROJECT FINANCE
Project finance lending involves taking full exposure to the
special purpose vehicle with servicing and eventual repay-
ment of the debt contingent on the financial health or oth-
erwise of that entity rather than its parent. Since loan
repayment is dependent on project cashflows alone, projects
are generally well structured with the project risks allocated
explicitly by a contractual framework to those parties best
able to manage or mitigate each specific risk. 
The project finance industry considers risks to fall into differ-
ent categories:
● Sovereign, or political: the risks associated with operat-
ing in a given country or region. Sovereign risks include
nationalisation, expropriation, currency convertibility,
breach of contract, war, and riot. The risk is usually nar-
rowly defined by insurers and guarantors whereas its real
scope can be very wide.
● Commercial: such risks are often split into the pre-com-
pletion phase and the post-completion phase, where
completion involves the end of construction and the
hand-over of the assets to the project’s operator. Pre-
completion risks include construction, delays and cost
over-runs. Post-completion include operating risk, tech-
nology, revenues and market risk, force majeure.
Project finance has provided a ready source of funding for
projects around the world, particularly in the heydays of the
1990s. Indeed global project finance lending (all sectors) in
2002 was $76 billion, itself a 43% reduction on the previous
year for reasons discussed below. Despite these huge sums
of money, only $157 million (less than 0.3%) was applied to
water and sewerage projects. And in 2000, 2001 and 2002
no bonds were issued in the water sector.47
Over the past few years it appears that only bank loans—
whether international or domestic—have been used to
finance private-sector water projects. Bond finance through
the debt capital markets does however remain a possibility
for the future. In the first instance though, project complex-
ity, challenging credit ratings and a general lack of track
record in water sector projects seem likely to restrict bond
investor appetite for water project financing, particularly in
the emerging markets.
On the loan side is the impact of several adverse factors: the
global economic slowdown; the effects of ‘flight to quality’
following the scandals at companies such as Enron and
WorldCom; the impact of the events on September 11th
2001; devaluations and financial stresses in key South
American markets; bank mergers which have had the effect
of reducing capacity; and large bank exposure to merchant
risk in the US and UK power sectors. Furthermore the poten-
tial threat posed by adverse changes to the treatment of proj-
ect finance loans by the Basel Committee in the form of
higher Tier 1 equity capital requirements has not yet been fac-
tored in (see below).
Each of these factors is acting to reduce international bank
demand for overseas—particularly emerging market—loan
exposure. But, there prevails a view that projects of an interna-
tional configuration that are ‘well-structured’, itself a compar-
ative concept, will find international commercial bank appetite
to lend to them. Such projects may be deemed ‘bankable’.
‘BANKABLE’ PROJECTS AND RISK ALLOCATION
The banks’ view will in general be driven by commercial fac-
tors, and it will be necessary for projects to be seen as ‘bank-
able’ so that money is lent, the project happens, and the loan
is repaid. The private sector will not be lending money to ven-
tures where the economics do not make sense and there is
no chance of loans being repaid and investment recouped.
Banks will see sovereign risk as the major issue in emerging
market water project financing. Commercial risk allocation in
general should not prove overly contentious. Risks should be
allocated to the party best able to bear them: construction to
contractors, operation to water companies, commercial
insurance to insurers/underwriters.
SOVEREIGN RISKS
Past experience has led banks to be wary of the political risks:
nationalisation; expropriation; breach of contract; currency
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devaluation, transferability and convertibility; war, riot and
social upheaval. Another important issue is whether the coun-
try—regardless of credit standing or wealth—has a track
record in developing projects over the years. The regulatory
environment and the government’s commitment to stability
will also be critical.
Banks will not accept much in the way of sovereign risks—
certainly not to the long tenors required. Such risks for any
reasonable maturity will require the involvement of export
credit agencies and MFIs to provide insurance or guarantees
48 for the sovereign element of project risk. Export credits may
also be made in the form of direct loans to importing organ-
isations or projects. 
In this respect, it would help if the rules of sovereign risk insur-
ance and guarantees were simplified, and documentation
requirements relaxed.
COMMERCIAL CONCERNS
In the eyes of lenders, the tariff should be economic, fair and
based on sustainable cost recovery. Tariffs tend to be a polit-
ical issue. Equity returns must be set high enough to be a fair
reflection of the risk being borne by investors, which is impor-
tant also for lenders because the equity is the ‘cushion’ to
debt service. In this respect, care should be taken pricing tar-
iffs in neighbouring regions. Anomalies in water tariffs in
adjacent regions can cause consumer dissatisfaction and pro-
mote tension with customers.
Financial risks such as inflation and real interest rates will be
for the account of the water off-takers or charge payers. The
tariff payable for the water services will be indexed to insu-
late the project from such macroeconomic factors. The proj-
ect should not be exposed to risks of devaluation,
transferability or convertibility (the panel’s proposal for a
Devaluation Liquidity Backstop Facility, discussed below, is
relevant here).
The risk of changes in environmental law or the costs of
changes in regulation will generally be borne by the off-taker
and/or the customers. Transparency in bidding is important
and banks will have concerns about the use of funds (and of
course the absence of corruption).
Renegotiations of concession documents will sap the credi-
bility of the bid process over time. In reality, renegotiation is
often necessary because of the paucity of information avail-
able to the bidders before the tender. In this situation, the
scope of work or investment required can often evolve dur-
ing the concession.
THE PROCESS
The intensive, time-consuming nature of project financing
leads to large economies of scale. Indeed scale is a major
impediment to private sector lending to the sector. Although
there may be many small water projects, banks will typically
want to see projects exceeding $50 to 100 million as a
financed cost, for this reason.
With private-sector finance, tenor (length of loan) is the clear-
est demonstration of lender appetite. As a general rule, long
tenors are required because water projects are usually for the
creation of long-term infrastructure assets. Given the local
content in many cases, water projects should aim at maxi-
mum local financing.
EXPANDING THE MARKET
Figure 3.1 in chapter 3 provided a schematic depiction of the
segmentation of the market for international water projects.
Figure 4.149 here provides a conceptual approach to extend-
ing the market for project financing in the water sector:
● Make project financing more reproducible. This will
depend on a market for water projects developing
together with track record and ‘market precedent’. This
will help to lower the minimum size of the project financ-
ing by reducing complexity and simplifying documenta-
tion. Lowering the minimum threshold for these projects
means that more of them can be financed by this
technique.
● Enhance the political cover of projects. Through changes
in export credit agencies and MFI political risk cover to
make it easier to do projects in tougher locations.
Extending political risk cover enhances the creditworthi-
ness of countries and municipalities previously considered
poor risks.
These two initiatives will shrink the Exposed Sector, which
contains projects previously unable to attract project finance.
It must be stressed that the base assumption to this approach
is that the projects to be financed are inherently sound and
viable. In practice, many projects may not be economic with-
out a subsidy of some kind. But this of itself does not make
projects unbankable, if the subsidy is sustainable and allows
the debt to be repaid and the sponsor investment to be
recouped.
Furthermore expanding the market for project finance
(increased non-recourse finance) will directly release funds for
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corporate purposes, thus increasing the total amount of
money for water investment. 
To summarise the methods for expanding the market for
water project finance (several have been proposed earlier),
the Panel proposes:
● Banks should focus initially on closing suitable transac-
tions, pick the low hanging fruit and start to develop a
track record and create a market precedent.
● As the market for water projects develops, banks should
attempt to standardise documentation and simplify the
financial and commercial process. If projects are easier to
close, requiring less time and effort, such fixed costs as
legal, financial and other due diligence charges will come
down allowing smaller projects to become feasible for
project finance.
● Governments, MFIs and banks should encourage the
development of local capital markets in which projects
can obtain part or all of their funding to enable better cur-
rency matching of revenues with borrowings.
● MFIs and export credit agencies should enhance and
extend political risk coverage for projects, including the
use of MFI guarantees and the relaxation in ECA rules on
guarantees and insurance.
● Banks and other interested parties should develop and
employ innovative financing techniques such as:
• Securitisation or collateralisation of loan/debt obliga-
tions (the combination of a number of individual proj-
ect loans into packages, which are then taken up by
other lenders).
• A Devaluation Liquidity Backstop Facility (see below).
A DEVALUATION LIQUIDITY BACKSTOPPING FACILITY
The panel identified foreign exchange risk, and the difficulty
of mitigating it, as a major disincentive to private sector
investment and obtaining commercial finance.
● The panel proposes a new Devaluation Liquidity
Backstopping Facility as one method of mitigating the risk
of foreign exchange fluctuations in water projects at the
sub-sovereign level.
Water service providers, or projects in the public or private
sectors, would have a new facility available to enable them
to continue to meet foreign currency obligations (such as
debt servicing) that suddenly become more onerous follow-
ing a large devaluation. The facility would be provided by an
international agency with an excellent credit rating (one or
more of the MFIs would be natural candidates). It would pay
to the foreign lenders the part of the debt (and possibly
equity) service which exceeds the reimbursement capacity of
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Figure 4.1 Water projects—expanding the market
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the project. The amounts paid by the facility would create
long-term loans to the national government (or to the local
government with a guarantee by the central government). Its
loans would in turn be guaranteed or repaid by the host gov-
ernment, which would recoup the proceeds from a specific
surcharge on water tariffs over a time period that is politically
and socially feasible. This approach, according to our sce-
nario, would generate sufficient revenue over the long term
to repay the loan.
The Facility would apply in the following cases:
● In projects, operated by either the private or public sec-
tors, which provide essential basic services such as water,
power, transport, telecommunications, etc
● Where the project operator is subject to targets and reg-
ulation set by government, such as on tariff levels, invest-
ment spending
● Where the WSP has no means of mitigating local currency
devaluation through escalation of the tariff and the proj-
ect partners such as the local government or water
authority have no way of preventing it.
Where bidders are invited to a competitive tender, the Facility
should for the sake of equity be available to all.
BIS/BASEL NEW CAPITAL ACCORD
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, part of the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), in January 2001
caused disquiet by releasing the initial proposal on the Basel
New Capital Accord, “Basel II”. The comments on the treat-
ment of project finance loans caused particular concern to
practitioners. Although there was nothing specific in the Basel
II proposals, the implication was that commercial banks’ proj-
ect finance loans were going to receive new and considerably
more severe capital allocation treatment under Basel II.
The Basel Committee had been taking a view that project
finance risks were higher than for general commercial lend-
ing. This perception ignored the considerably higher level of
structuring in project finance loans. Indeed, analysis shows
loan delinquencies and loss norms to be lower for project
finance than for general corporate business. 
The Basel Committee received many comments and submis-
sions from industry on its January 2001 proposals. After a
review during most of 2002 the Basel Committee has simpli-
fied its proposals as they relate to project finance and other
specialised loans. Under Basel II, the onus will be on banks to
assess their capital adequacy relative to their residual risks
using an internal ratings-based approach. The upshot is that
many banks will now be able to treat these forms of lending
identically to other corporate exposures.
The Basel Committee initiated a Quantitative Impact Survey
in October 200250 to allow banks to evaluate the impact of
Basel II to come back with their views. Thereafter the Basel
Committee will finalise its New Capital Accord in the fourth
quarter of 2003 with a view to implementation by the end of
2006. The current perception among project finance practi-
tioners is that the Basel process is probably not as threaten-
ing as it was at the end of 2001, but that its impact remains
to be analysed and a potential threat remains. Clearly, if the
capital requirements for project finance become more
demanding than at present, that would have a serious impact
on the current shallow market for project finance and reduce
the supply of funds.
Export credit agencies
At the Johannesburg World Summit in 2002 export credit
agencies accepted their role in sustainable development in
the following terms:
“Building on achievements in export credit disciplines (e.g.
interest rates, tied aid and risk premium fees) and con-
scious of new challenges, inter alia in the context of WTO
developments, ECA Members and the Participants con-
tinue to seek, in the forums of the OECD, to eliminate
trade distortions and to work toward a level playing field
on which exporters can compete fairly. This will continue
to be complemented by the more qualitative elements of
governments’ activity in the field of export credits (e.g.
environment) in the wider context of good governance
and sustainable development (from the text for the
Implementation Plan).”
At that Summit, water and renewable energy were identified
as the two priority areas of development for export credit
agencies to play a role.
The OECD’s Export Credits Group (ECG), started in the early
1970s and came into its own in the late 1970s with the cre-
ation of the Arrangement on Export Credits, the first step in
a 20-year campaign that has largely eliminated explicit sub-
sidies from official export credits. Key steps were putting
interest rates at market levels in the early 1980s, setting lim-
its to the use of tied aid in the early 1990s and coordinating
risk premia in the late 1990s. Since the completion of work
on premia in the late 1990s, the ECG has turned its atten-
tion to the more “qualitative” aspects of official export credit
(such as bribery, unproductive expenditure and the environ-
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ment), trying to use export credits as leverage to attain
broader social goals. Success in these areas is still to
materialise.
Governmental attitudes to the link between export credits
and social goals varies widely and leaves little chance of find-
ing true consensus at anything but the lowest common
denominator. Although the ECG has produced an agreement
on bribery, an understanding on unproductive expenditure
and “common approaches” on the environment, none of
these documents is binding or makes much progress towards
achieving the social goals. 
The ECG is considering how it can reconcile its functions with
the expanding role of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
At issue is whether the OECD or the WTO will become the
ruling body for official export credits. Meanwhile there is
growing use of “market windows”; and more resort to
untied aid and funding options outside the limits of the OECD
Arrangement.
Another development is advocacy by various organisations,
especially NGOs, that a specific share of export credit agency
activity should be earmarked for renewable projects (for
instance, at Johannesburg a figure of 10% of energy projects
was suggested). Although this idea was not formally adopted
in Johannesburg, it continues to receive serious consideration
in several capitals. In this connection, the United States has
targeted water for Ex-Im Bank and OPIC activity, indicating
the need to double resources on water over the next five
years. Ex-Im Bank only covered $42 million of water projects
in fiscal 2000, less than 1% of its annual budget. An OPIC-
supported equity fund committed approximately $42 million
in water-related projects. For a variety of reasons—including
the lack of creditworthy projects none of these mechanisms
has been used to its full potential.
In recent years, the export credit agencies of OECD countries
have collectively provided about $70 billion annually of long-
term credit for developing countries (both public and private
sectors) for purchasing goods and services in OECD members.
Probably less than 1% of this amount has been for water and
renewable energy projects. In such a context the panel rec-
ommends that all OECD countries and their export credit
agencies emulate the U.S. target of doubling water activity
over the next five years.
LOCAL COSTS
As part of the general effort to update the OECD
Arrangement and bring its processes into line with WTO prin-
ciples, the Norwegian government has proposed the elimi-
nation of any limit on official export credit agency support for
local costs. The justification presented for this proposal is that
limits on the capacity to finance local costs is one of the
biggest constraints to many projects, especially for infra-
structure, in developing countries. This proposal was not sup-
ported by other export credit agencies; most agencies
operating with exposure limits are opposed to taking more
exposure per dollar of exports. But since local costs are so
important in water projects, this proposal could have a big
impact.
The Panel has the following specific proposals for export
credit agencies:
● The OECD could incorporate into the Arrangement a
requirement that 2%/3% of aggregate export credit
agencies credit be directed annually to water projects.
This could provide incremental funding of an estimated
$1.5 to $2.5 billion annually for water projects in the
developing countries.
● The OECD should consider allowing 20-year repayment
terms (the current limit is 10 years) for water. Although
no incentives are currently available for any sector, the
OECD could (as it did for project finance cases) act to give
special term flexibility to any sector it wishes. Such flexi-
bility would most likely be in the form of longer terms and
greater freedom to shape the repayment profile to cash
flows.
● The OECD should consider raising the credit ceiling for
local costs for water projects from 15% (the current max-
imum) to 50% of the export value. This would provide a
substantial increase in funding for local costs at a
moment when there is only limited and costly funding
available.
● Export credit agencies should consider offering guaran-
tees and loans in local currency.
Private investment and operation
Private sector participation in its various forms is an option
available to governments and water authorities in developing
this sector. In the light of the experience summarised in chap-
ter 2, the panel takes a pragmatic view on this issue. It is clear
that public utilities, responsible today for 97% of the popu-
lation concerned, have to act decisively if the Millennium
goals are to be met. This means reforming the way they oper-
ate, their financial management, the way they relate to their
customers, the confidence they create in their financiers and
investors, whether public or private. This is a huge endeav-
our, which has to succeed. 
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It is equally clear that in rural areas and in the poor suburbs
of cities, nothing can be really achieved without full coop-
eration with the local communities. In this, the role of serv-
ice-oriented NGOs cannot be overestimated. Utilities must
have their responsibilities clearly defined, split between the
owner of the infrastructure (most often the municipality)
and the utility itself. An authority must act as the regulator,
with a clearly defined mandate and responsibility, and
supervise the operator, public as well as private. The para-
mount responsibility of the public authority is to assign the
goals, to explicitly state the tariff policies, to define required
investment and to decide funding sources. Under these con-
ditions there is room not only for public utilities but also for
private operators to perform their trade, to use their skills
and to point the way for better efficiency and better cus-
tomer satisfaction.
SMALL LOCAL ENTREPRENEURS
Discussions of the private sector in water often take for
granted that the issue is the involvement of large multina-
tional companies, which at present serve around 3% of the
developing world’s population. There is another private sec-
tor, locally based, including both large and small operators.
Some of the major concessions are joint ventures between
international companies and local firms. Local private firms
are often involved in construction and subcontracting.
Smaller-scale local entrepreneurs are pervasive in large, low-
income cities, providing services to complement, and com-
pensate for, coverage by public utilities. It is also true that in
many developing countries the expansion of private enter-
prise is cramped by official policies and that this important
source of growth is not working to its full potential. 
Research in Africa, Latin America and Asia shows that people
without access to a connection are concentrated in low-
income areas and that a large number of them rely on alter-
native forms of services delivered by small-scale private water
providers. The proportion of the population covered in this
way varies from 6% in Delhi, 10% in Dhaka, 19% in Ho Chi
Minh City, and 44% in Jakarta.51
There are many different forms of this small-scale private
involvement, and no single policy response would be appro-
priate. The private sector has often thrived because of the fail-
ings of the public authorities: a reformed and more responsive
public sector could mean a smaller market share for private
providers, though not necessarily a smaller role in absolute
terms. In fact, local private providers have advantages, such
as closeness to consumers, flexibility, use of local materials
and technology and better adaptation to customer require-
ments. They are not necessarily saints either, since there are
many cases of monopoly and extortion, and water quality is
often worse than in the public supplies. The first step in
engaging them is to recognize and then to understand their
potential role and the constraints affecting them—followed
by their gradual access to financial markets, within a properly
defined regulatory framework. 
● Governments and water authorities should recognise
the present and potential role of small-scale private
water providers and other parts of the local private sec-
tor, provide a legal framework which can encourage
greater long-term investments by them, including their
role in private concessions and the decentralisation of
services.
● Governments should include small-scale private water
providers in their national water supply strategies and
service development plans, including incentives for them
to improve their services. 
● Small-scale private water providers should be encouraged
to improve their access to finance to increase their capac-
ity to invest in the sector and reduce their cost of capital.
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES
Compared with 10 years ago, there are now fewer serious
and credible private international companies willing to invest
in emerging and developing markets. Several flagship water
concessions have suffered from devaluations in the host
countries, which made debt servicing more difficult. In any
case, apart from their own equity, companies tend to finance
their projects by drawing on the same capital markets as oth-
ers, though they often induce complementary financing that
would not otherwise happen. Also, tax regimes often favour
public financing. These and other reasons limit the contribu-
tion by private operators in strictly financial terms, though
there is potential for an increase if current hurdles are
removed.
The panel believes , however, that experienced private com-
panies can bring great potential benefits to the reform of
water agencies—by transferring skills and experience, use of
market disciplines and access to finance. The private sector
brings skills and experience useful in reforming water agen-
cies and improving their financial sustainability. It can be
effective in extending services to the poor, where contracted
to do so. It can add credibility to a project, which opens the
door to more finance on better terms. The prospect of private
involvement, even where it does not come about, may gal-
vanise public agencies into carrying out reforms. But where
private participation is applied, it is important for credibility
and public acceptance to make the bidding and contractual
processes transparent and fair. 
32 Financing Water For All
Even if it is clear that one cannot expect a significant private
role in the rural sector or for very scattered communities, it is
equally obvious that in a world of very rapid urbanisation,
their role, for all the above reasons, can be decisive. Many are
of the view, that their role will be critical for reaching the
Millennium targets, because a significant proportion of the
population growth in the next 20 years will take place in areas
of high population density, where their managerial and tech-
nological assets will be in high demand.
● The prospect of private sector participation in its various
forms can be a powerful spur to the reform of public
water agencies. In situations where reforms are being
considered or tenders of various kinds are being drawn
up, private participation should be included as an option,
to be decided on specific grounds of efficiency, cost and
effectiveness. Procurement decisions as a rule should be
made on the basis of open and transparent competition,
typically through bidding. 
Where governments decide that the private option has
advantages, it should be facilitated by the better allocation
and mitigation of risk. In view of the potentially vital contri-
bution of private involvement, the panel proposes measures
to address four specific problems that currently discourage
private participation in water. These proposals are addressed
partly to private companies, and partly to governments and
the international financial community, which will each have
a part in implementing the solutions.
First, aid donors are inhibited from backing private participa-
tion directly because of a desire to avoid subsidising profits.
The panel understands this concern, but believes that aid
funds can be combined with private funding in ways that
meet these concerns.
● The panel believes that water projects can be financed
by combining public funds with private financing in
transparent and acceptable ways. Public money can be
used to stimulate projects for benefiting the general
population without granting undue benefits to private
parties. 
● ODA should be available to facilitate water projects man-
aged by private operators under public control—for
example output-based aid could be used to expand net-
works or fund revenue shortfalls on a diminishing basis
under a concession. Alternatively, aid could be used to
finance investment in assets owned by the public and
operated by the private sector.
Second, investors and lenders are discouraged by foreign
exchange risk, which is virtually impossible to insure against
commercially. In concessions, companies may take over exist-
ing foreign debt, take on new foreign loans, and need to
remit dividends. All these become more expensive following
a devaluation. Various methods of mitigating this risk have
been tried, involving reserves to meet the devaluation con-
tingency52 or national schemes for guaranteeing the future
foreign exchange rate.53 But they tend to be time-consuming
to arrange, and are limited in scale.
The contracts that water service providers operate under usu-
ally include a clause allowing tariff increases to cover defined
categories of cost. Devaluation above a certain threshold level
may well be included as an eligible cost increase, and mod-
erate devaluations could be compensated over time by such
a formula. The real problem comes with a massive devalua-
tion, which would trigger a tariff increase of such proportions
that it is totally unrealistic to expect it to be implemented.
Several of the largest private concessions (Buenos Aires,
Manila, Jakarta) in the last 10 years have been affected by
major devaluations, which have greatly increased the local
currency requirements for servicing foreign debt, and caused
liquidity crises for the providers. The outcome is usually some
renegotiation of their contractual commitments plus tariff
increases, but in all cases there is disruption to their opera-
tions and investment programmes. 
● The devaluation liquidity backstopping facility proposed
in earlier addresses the devaluation risk for public and pri-
vate sector promoters and operators taking on foreign
currency commitments.
Third, the heavy fixed costs of preparing tenders and con-
tracts for private participation restricts the pipeline of such
projects and raises the minimum size of contract that is
worthwhile. 
● The Revolving Funds proposed earlier are addressed to
the problem of the large fixed costs of preparing private
participation contracts and tenders.
Fourth, some of the specific risks in the water sector, such as
unpredictable government behaviour, are so damaging that
they prevent many projects from maturing. When hiring pri-
vate operators, governments should recognise that a long-
term partnership can succeed only if the public body fully
plays its role and complies with its commitments. This type of
risk can be mitigated by the public partner providing securi-
ties and/or by insurance and guarantee instruments offered
by MFIs and other agencies. For instance, MIGA offers cover
against breach of contract in concession agreements, trans-
fer restrictions, political instability and violence, though this
applies only to cross-border investors. The World Bank’s
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Partial Risk Guarantees cover lenders in the case of a default
on contractual obligations to a project company. 
The difficulty here results not from the absence of appropriate
coverage schemes for these risks, but from the fact that the
responsible bodies frequently adopt a very restrictive interpre-
tation of their mandates and instruments. This is no longer
acceptable in the present circumstances. The Panel recom-
mends that these bodies review their internal regulations and
procedures, with the object of providing significantly increased
coverage of the risks confronted in the water sector.
● Guarantee and insurance schemes offered by MFIs, gov-
ernments and export credit agencies should be expanded
in scope and internal constraints on their use should be
relaxed. The specific needs of the water sector should be
better covered. 
● Governments taking up private sector participation
should provide adequate securities to create trust in the
sustainability of long-term contracts
Community initiatives and service-oriented
NGOs
Civil society groups within the water and sanitation sector
perform several roles: 
● Service providers—helping to build user-managed
schemes.
● Advocates for the poor. 
● Participants in open planning processes to ensure that
poor people’s needs are at the top of development
agenda. 
● Watchdogs, scrutinising the investment decisions of gov-
ernments and donors and raising alarms on any negative
impact of these decisions. 
Locally based groups are in a strong position to insist on, and
influence, the choice of their communities for the technology
and level of service to be supplied. To the extent they are suc-
cessful, the resulting schemes are more cost-effective and
client-centred than they would otherwise be, and thus more
sustianable. 
● Civil society roles in water provision need to be supported,
and their capacity to perform more effectively needs
enhancing. Building the capacity of different local and
national civil society stakeholders to perform independ-
ent watchdog roles is also important in addressing the
blight of corruption.
Across the world individual households, including poor ones,
make substantial investments to improve their water supply
and sanitation. Financial instruments from domestic private
sources such as loans, and from the public sector in the form
of subsidies for the poorest, must be developed to further
facilitate these investments. At the same time, micro-credit
initiatives need to be encouraged to provide low-cost finance
to households for water supply and sanitation improvements.
Governments are in a position to leverage these kinds of
resources, as the experience of India’s Total Rural Sanitation
Programme shows.54
● Micro-credit schemes, important in financing community
water projects, should be supported by donors, MFIs and
external NGOs through the provision of seed capital, ini-
tial reserves and guarantees. Continuing subsidies should,
however, be avoided as they tend to damage the sus-
tainability of such schemes.
External NGOs are important channels for funds for local ini-
tiatives, through the donations they raise and through attract-
ing matching government contributions. A promising avenue
is to explore the scope for inviting water consumers in indus-
trialised countries to add, on a voluntary basis, a modest
amount to the payment of their bills, on the understanding
that the proceeds would be allocated to decentralised bodies
in developing countries for financing well-chosen and exem-
plary projects.
● External (“northern”) NGOs should propose ways of rais-
ing more funds for channeling to their local partners
through various solidarity mechanisms.
Among local communities there is usually a great demand for
better water services and a willingness to commit local
resources to their implementation. What is often lacking is
capacity—organising, financial, technical. The panel is
attracted to the idea of creating a fund in each of the regional
development banks that could be drawn on by local groups—
NGOs, associations, community representatives—to build
capacity through training, hiring advice, creating partnerships
and attracting funding. Funding could come from a spectrum
of organisations, but with a minimum amount of intermedi-
ation. A local supervisory committee would be appointed to
be accountable for the use of funds and to vouch for the qual-
ity of the product. 
● The panel proposes that a full study be conducted of the
feasibility of creating Decentralised Funds for the
Development of Local Initiatives. 
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Implementing the proposals: 
a three-phase strategy
In this report the panel has laid out a strategy and the main
lines of a program for increasing the flow of funds into the
global water sector. Many of the proposals will need further
study and elaboration by the parties involved. The Kyoto
Forum is an ideal opportunity for the various parties identi-
fied in this report to endorse and to start work on their
respective proposals. Subsequent high-level meetings in
2003 will be occasions for keeping up and developing
momentum. Aware that the time is fortuitous for imple-
menting the proposals in this report, the panel urges all par-
ties involved to maximize the synergies to be exploited. 
In view of the lack of basic data and the magnitude of the
administrative, financial and even cultural changes implied by
the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals
for water, the Panel was not in a position to define a fully
fledged and comprehensive global financial strategy. Its pro-
posals nevertheless constitute the basic foundations of a
strategy that could unfold in three stages. It should be
recalled that 2025 has always been the panel’s implicit tar-
get, with 2015 as the key interim stop.
Launched in 2003—the International Year of Water—the
strategy would go through an initial stage ending in 2006 on
the occasion of the 4th World Water Forum. This meeting
would provide an opportunity to review the measures
endorsed at Kyoto, the G8 meeting at Evian in June 2003 and
at subsequent gatherings—and the actions to implement
them. By 2006 most of the necessary measures proposed in
this report should have been taken, or should be on the way
to yielding results. 2006 would also be a good vantage point
for making any necessary corrections of trajectory for target-
ing the key 2015 MDGs. By that time, if the recommended
strategy has made a good start, the relevant authorities will
be in a better position to assess and adopt other measures,
the need for which could not be foreseen earlier. The period
2003–06 would constitute the first phase.
The period 2006–15 would be the crucial second phase, con-
taining the main push towards fulfilling the MDGs.
The third phase would be the period 2015–25, when the
world community could realise the vision of universal water
and sanitation, and the broader aim of water security, if the
same intense effort and focus were maintained,
● 2006 should be the first checkpoint on the route to 2015.
This would be an opportunity to review the measures
endorsed at Kyoto and at subsequent gatherings, and
actions taken to implement these. 
● 2015 should be the next essential check-point, opening
the third stage of a strategy leading to universal access
and sanitation by 2025.
For this three-phase strategy to be maintained, made more
comprehensive and adapted to changing circumstances, a
major gap in the global institutional system would have to be
filled. No single international organization has a clear and
undisputed role for monitoring water. A number of interna-
tional bodies, including the panels’s sponsors, fulfil valuable
functions in this respect. But none has the key mandate of
being a global “control tower” systematically collecting, eval-
uating and publishing data on the performance of the vari-
ous parties. Reluctant as it is to increase the number of
international organisations, the panel thinks that a “global
control tower” with the abovementioned function would be
indispensable. It could be formed from the resources of exist-
ing units, reformed, coordinated and supplemented, as nec-
essary, or it could be a new body. In either case, a limited
number of permanent staff would be required to help coun-
tries gather the required data and track global progress. The
“control tower” would produce an annual report and its
activities would be conducted in full public transparency.
To complement the work of the “control tower” ensure the
right conclusions are drawn from its work, and that any nec-
essary action is taken, we recommend that a permanent
group containing independent “wise persons” of acknowl-
edged calibre and standing be formed with the task of eval-
uating ongoing developments, appraising the information
collected by the “control tower” and making any suggestions
judged appropriate to achieve the water MDGs.
● Progress towards achieving the MDGs should be system-
atically monitored by a global “control tower” consisting
of a reporting network and an independent committee
of “wise persons”. Existing systems for collecting and
reporting data on global water should be reformed,
strengthened and coordinated, as appropriate.
Information should be produced on progress towards the
MDG water targets and on the performance of the many
parties implementing and funding this effort. The data
would be evaluated by a group of “wise persons” who
would make recommendations on the steps to be taken
to secure the water MDGs. 
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Priorities
If chapter 4’s proposals were all implemented quickly, a crit-
ical mass would be created to make a big impact on the finan-
cial resources available to water. But the proposals differ in
the ease of their implementation, and in the speed of their
impact.
Meanwhile, the clock is ticking towards 2015, not to men-
tion 2025. This chapter suggests some priorities for the inter-
national community, recognising that some early progress
needs to be made in reducing service deficits, particularly
amongst the poor in Africa. Success will breed success, and
virtuous circles will be launched. At this point, it should be
recalled that the panel’s task is not only to address household
water and sanitation deficits, but also to propose financial
measures for global water in its broader sense. The urgency
of meeting the MDGs for 2015 should not overshadow the
importance of funding the other needs of the wider water
sector over a longer time horizon.
● The first priority is for host governments to be clear on
their strategies and priorities for the water sector—and
to plan accordingly. 
Donors, NGOs, MFIs, companies and others can assist, but
there has to be real political “ownership” of the effort from
host governments as a precondition.
Examples
Preparation of water sector strategies 
Detailed action programmes for meeting MDGs
Inclusion of waterpolicies in PRSPs
● Second, facilities that already exist should be used as finan-
cial vehicles, replenished and empowered as necessary. 
Unnecessary constraints on their operations should be
removed. Organisations with viable plans and projects, but a
shortage of finance, should be targeted. 
Examples
Donors to refocus aid for water and coordinate through the
DAC and others
Donors to give priority to strengthening core public capabili-
ties
MFIs to reconsider attitude to capital provisioning
Greater use of guarantees
Export credit rules modified
MFIs and donors to resume qualified lending for water
storage
NGOs with good project pipeline to be targeted for assistance
Private companies (local and international) to be used as con-
tractors and managers
● Third, proposals for new agencies, funds and schemes
should urgently be studied for their detailed feasibility,
and their implementation mapped out, with sponsors
identified. 
Examples
Decentralised Fund for Local Initiatives
Revolving Fund for tender preparation and contract award
Devaluation Liquidity Backstopping Facility
● Fourth, policy changes and reforms to institutions likely
to have longer lead times should be set in motion. 
Examples
Tariff reform
Reforms to public water agencies
Measures to strengthen financial powers of sub-sovereigns
Actions required from main parties
The measures proposed in this report call for actions by
seven main categories of actors: central governments from
both developed and developing countries, sub-sovereign
bodies, community organisations and NGOs, banks and pri-
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vate investors, aid donors, multilateral financial institutions,
and members of the UN system and other international
organisations.
Central governments in developing countries need to prepare
water strategies and action programmes for 2015 and to
inscribe water policies in PRSPs. They need to start reforms for
public water institutions, drawing on various models for
cooperation. They need to work out the financial relationship
between central governments and sub-sovereign entities and
to propose measures to expand and deepen local capital mar-
kets, including use of pension funds. 
Central governments of developed countries have responsi-
bilities to ensure that the international institutions and
agreements that have governed the world economy over the
last few generations are well adapted for the challenges of
the new Millennium—and if not, how they should be
reformed. This applies particularly to aid, the governance of
MFIs, and the consensus over international finance and
export credit.
Sub-sovereign national bodies, such as local governments
and water authorities, are the fulcrums of reform and action
in the water sector. They have the responsibilities, but not all
of them have the necessary skills, efficiency and financial
powers. Theirs is a huge and challenging agenda of actions.
Community organisations, supported by service-oriented
NGOs, are the first line of attack on the water sector at the
grass-roots. They should aim for a more ambitious role in
influencing and monitoring the performance of the institu-
tions that supply water services. They should explore ways of
raising more external funds through their NGO partners and
become involved in local finance through micro-credit and
other multi-partner schemes.
Banks and private investors should be looking for ways to
increase their involvement in the water sector, following sev-
eral years of decline. Exploring innovative financing tech-
niques adapted to the specific needs of the sector is part of
the answer. But there is much scope for the greater uptake
of what is available, such as guarantees and insurance.
Contracts and documentation could be streamlined. The pro-
posed facility to inject liquidity after devaluations should be
of interest.
Aid donors need to stand by their commitments to increase
aid for water, which should immediately be doubled as a
first step. Donors should focus unremittingly on helping
achieve the water MDGs, and later the wider goals of global
water security. ODA will need refocusing among countries
and within the sector itself, and should support the
strengthening of core public capabilities. It should favour
countries with sound water programmes and reward early
progress. Aid should increasingly be seen and used to catal-
yse other kinds of finance. Donors should take the lead in
developing the new instruments proposed here, such as the
Decentralised Fund, the Devaluation Facility and the
Revolving Fund.
Multilateral financial institutions (MFIs) will be the pillars of
the new water financial architecture. They should do every-
thing to reverse the recent decline in their water lending and
make every effort to expand their use of guarantees and
insurance. They should overcome their reluctance to lend for
water storage schemes. 
UN agencies and other international organisations need to
develop new forms of relevant cooperation to support the
reform effort in the water institutions of developing coun-
tries. The OECD and its DAC have a clear role in mobilising,
coordinating and monitoring the water aid effort. The OECD
should look hard at the impact of its export credit consensus
and whether it can be changed to favour the water sector.
The Basel Committee should review the impact of its recom-
mendations on lending to infrastructure in emerging
markets.
Impacts on the main sub-sectors
The panel’s intention has been to balance the needs of dif-
ferent water sub-sectors. This has not been easy. Inevitably,
because of the prominence given to reducing the service
deficits of the poor in the MDGs and Earth Summit, the needs
of poor households have absorbed much of the panel’s time.
Each sub-sector requires its own distinctive approach, and
many solutions are sector-specific. In particular, the financing
of irrigation is a complicated and stubborn problem. With
these reservations, the panel believes that its proposals would
have financial benefits for each of the main branches of the
water sector, summarised below.
Urban household water and sanitation
Poor urban households would benefit directly or indirectly
from many of the proposals: increased and more closely tar-
geted aid; the involvement of NGOs and companies in proj-
ect design and service delivery; reforms and financial
strengthening of sub-sovereign entities and water authori-
ties; the mobilisation of local savings and development of
local capital markets; and others.
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Rural and village water
Aid would become more targeted on regions and social
groups most in need of public subsidy. Donors would specif-
ically be urged to support special rural water programmes
being mounted by regional bodies. NGOs would be strength-
ened in their capacity to assist local community projects.
Financial strengthening of urban water authorities would
increase resources available for cross-subsidising smaller and
financially weaker communities.
Wastewater collection and treatment
Wastewater services, normally more costly per unit than pro-
viding freshwater, account for a high proportion of the extra
$100 billion required annually. Many urban systems have no
proper wastewater treatment plants, so it is becoming common
to add to systems through private BOT projects.55 In this con-
text, proposals for tariff reform are especially relevant, since tar-
iffs would need to rise considerably to meet the cost of
wastewater services, whether provided in-house by the public
utility or on a “take or pay” basis by a private company. The
panel’s proposals on tender and contract terms, the revolving
fund and the development of insurance and guarantees are also
highly relevant to attracting private finance into wastewater.
Irrigation
The reengagement of MFIs and donors with dams and other
major hydraulic works would improve water and food secu-
rity for many farmers, especially in Africa. Public irrigation
agencies are one type of sub-sovereign entity that could ben-
efit from more financial autonomy, though major reforms are
going to be needed to improve their creditworthiness. In
selected schemes where conditions are favourable, private
concessions are feasible (and are being invited). These would
benefit from the extended use of insurance and guarantee
instruments, and from the proposed liquidity facility. Small-
scale farmer-financed schemes would benefit from the pro-
posals to develop local capital markets, micro-credit and
development finance institutions.
Hydropower
Most large hydro schemes are in the public sector and
dependent on public investment, supplemented by foreign
aid and international and national borrowing. A minority of
projects, mainly small run-of-the-river schemes, are private
investments. The proposal on dams would encourage more
MFI and donor support. Commercial bank lending would
benefit from the wider use of insurance and guarantee prod-
ucts, and from wider use of the MFIs’ B-loan and Preferred
Creditor Status products. Bond issues for hydro would also
gain from more use of Partial Credit Guarantees, which
would extend maturities and lower rates. 
Industrial and commercial water and
wastewater
There is no major financial problem involved in industrial
water use, which is either taken from public mains or
obtained from the company’s own sources. In either case, the
payment for water or the investment required is usually a
minor part of company income and can be passed on to con-
sumers. Financing the pre-treatment of effluents will, how-
ever, become an increasing charge on companies to meet
tighter pollution control. The assumption of most pollution
measures is that industry will meet the cost of treatment
itself, from its normal financial sources, supplemented in
many countries by recycling the proceeds of pollution levies
and environmental taxes for approved investment in abate-
ment. For companies and parastatals for which funding will
be difficult, our proposals on local capital markets and devel-
opment banks should be helpful.
Resource management and environmental
protection
For various aspects of resource management and protection
there is no serious alternative to funding through the pub-
lic sector. The annual recurring cost of resource manage-
ment usually falls on the budget of the local government
(though there are examples of groundwater aquifers being
managed privately, funded by users). New capital projects
(afforestation, dams, flood control, pollution clean-ups) also
fall largely to governments, with help from donors and MFIs.
At the margin, the cost and funding of some multipurpose
schemes can be shared with other parties, or neighbouring
countries. The panel’s proposal on water storage should
help the re-entry of donor and MFI money to this sector.
Proposals to focus aid and public subsidy on these public
goods, among other priority uses, should work in the same
direction.
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Description
A new facility would prevent the disruption of water services
due to the impact of a large devaluation, by rescheduling the
service of foreign debt over a time period that is politically
and socially feasible.
Justification
The facility would be of value to local authorities, which
organize water services, set water tariffs, and request their
water service provider (WSP) to undertake investment or to
take over water-related foreign debt incurred by previous
administrations.
It is impossible to insure commercially against devaluation,
since the risk cannot be estimated with any precision, and
political risk insurance does not normally cover this event.
Several of the largest water projects (e.g. Buenos Aires,
Manila, Sao Paulo, Jakarta) undertaken by developing coun-
tries during the last 10 years have been affected by major
devaluations, which have greatly increased the local currency
requirements for servicing foreign debt previously borrowed
by public or private bodies, and caused liquidity crises for the
water authorities and providers. The outcome is usually a
lengthy process of modification of the local water policy
(investment programs, tariff increases, fiscal revenues) aim-
ing at rebalancing the economics of the water service. In all
cases, there is disruption of the debt service and investment
programs. 
Scope
The facility would apply in the following cases:
● Projects operated by either the private or public sectors,
● Projects where the WSP is subject to targets and regula-
tion (e.g. over tariffs, investment spending) set by gov-
ernment,
● Projects where the WSP has no means of mitigating
devaluation, and where the project partners (local
authority, WSP) have no way of avoiding it.
Practical aspects and
implementation
● International guarantor: The facility would actually be a
contingent facility provided by an international public
body (MFI or ECA) with an excellent financial standing,
able to bear the financial onus from devaluation to the
end of the revenue recovery period. The international
body would effectively guarantee the foreign loans and
finance the additional debt service incurred from devalu-
ation. The guarantee would be counter-guaranteed by
the national government, and guarantor disbursements
would create sovereign debt. The national government
would recoup reimbursements by levying an appropriate
water surcharge, directly or through the local water
authority. It would be possible to involve a third party to
provide the loan, perhaps a local commercial or develop-
ment bank. The international guarantor would then guar-
antee the payments of this third party. 
● Facility reimbursement: The collection of the surcharge
could be done by the usual billing entity. But the respon-
sibility for repaying the amounts disbursed by the facility
should be borne primarily by the government or the local
authority, which has the power to set the tariffs.
● Affordable exchange rate: Based on macroeconomic fore-
casts (including inflation and exchange rates, usually
based on purchasing power parity), the initial base case
financial model (drafted when the foreign loan is con-
tracted) predicts a specific debt service to revenues per-
Annex 1. 
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centage every year. Assuming all operational considera-
tions are unchanged, the same percentage of actual rev-
enues is available during the life of the loan for debt
service, whatever the actual macroeconomic parameters.
This percentage translates into a nominal amount of local
currency (“affordable debt service”), which, when divided
by the payment due in foreign currency, gives what is des-
ignated as the “affordable exchange rate”, for each year.
After being adjusted for a deductible, this rate becomes
the threshold above which the facility would intervene.
● The facility would include the following features:
• The project pays annual premiums to the facility.
• The project fully services the foreign debt as long as
the actual exchange rate does not exceed the “afford-
able exchange rate”.
• Any positive post-devaluation impact on the part of
WSP’s revenue which was anticipated to service the
foreign debt (e.g. tariff increases to compensate for
local inflation) would reduce the amounts to be fur-
ther funded by the facility.
• A minimum level of devaluation is borne by the proj-
ect. For example a deductible of 10% of the afford-
able exchange rate is set, below which no drawing on
the facility would be made.
• If agreed by the parties, the part of WSP’s revenue
which was anticipated to service the WSP equity (when
invested in foreign currency) may well be partly pro-
tected by the facility in a similar way.
User impact
The potential impact of this facility has been tested on hypo-
thetical projects facing a 50% (or 67%) devaluation. The ini-
tial devaluation occurs at the point where foreign debt service
would have represented 17% of annual revenues without
devaluation. Under the proposed facility scheme, tariffs
would not need to rise immediately to adjust for devaluation.
End-users would pay a surcharge that would gradually
increase over five years to 2.3% (or 5%) of the tariff, with an
annual increase of less than 1.4% ( or 3.1%). The sovereign
debt created would peak at 20% ( or 40%) of protected debt
in foreign currency terms. At all times, and assuming that
other devaluation impacts are mitigated, the WSP would
remain profitable and pay its corporate taxes to the
government.
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Justification
Rural areas in Africa have the least coverage of safe drinking
water supply and sanitary disposal of excreta. Currently about
400 million people in Africa (50% of total population) lack
access to safe water supply and an even higher figure lack
adequate sanitation. Nearly 330 million of this population live
in rural areas. Consequently, rural populations are burdened
to a greater extent by preventable water and sanitation-
related diseases, suffer greater deprivation of women and
children not attending school or engaging in economic activ-
ities due to time and effort needed to fetch water. These
problems together combine to perpetuate poverty in the rural
areas of Africa. In addition, there is very limited scope for pri-
vate sector participation in rural areas; most of the invest-
ments required would have to come from governments,
bilateral sources, multilateral agencies, NGOs and community
efforts.
To provide access to safe drinking water supply and sanita-
tion to the unserved, and accommodate the increase in pop-
ulation over the next two decades, the rate of increase in
coverage over the next 20 years has to exceed 19 million rural
inhabitants per year. There is therefore a need to accelerate
the pace of development of the sector with specific focus on
coverage while not ignoring sustainability and effectiveness,
using fast-track mechanisms, and highly innovative, broad-
based, participatory, inclusive and community-based
approaches.
Goal and objectives 
The goal of the Initiative is to accelerate access to sustainable
water supply and sanitation to rural Africa within the frame-
work of the Africa Water Vision. This would be achieved
through the following strategic interventions:
● Develop and implement fast-track mechanisms for
preparing and implementing of interventions to signifi-
cantly accelerate the implementation of the national rural
water supply and sanitation programmes.
● Implement projects, with the participation of beneficiar-
ies, to extend and sustain rapid coverage of water supply
and sanitation services to rural areas.
● Promote technologies that are appropriate, based on
beneficiaries’ consensus as to acceptable levels of serv-
ices, ease of implementation, local skills and knowledge
for their operation and maintenance.
● Mobilize higher levels of funding from official develop-
ment assistance (ODA) and promote and support local
initiatives for funding rural water supply and sanitation.
Targets 
Targets for the Initiative and indicative costs are given below:
● 66% of the rural population with access to drinking
water supply and sanitation by 2010 from the present
34%.
● 80% of the rural population with access to drinking
water supply and sanitation by 2015.
The average annual investments in the first seven years (up
to 2010) is $1.4 billion, and thereafter about $900 million a
year. The targets are set as overall figures for the continent.
The Initiative will in practice initially begin in five to seven
countries with relatively well developed water sector policy
and existing capacity to implement the Initiative and then
proceed to other countries on the continent.
Annex 2. 
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Approach
Fast-track mechanisms mean flexible, transparent, and fast-
paced procedures for programme and project preparation,
appraisal, and implementation as well as procurement, dis-
bursements and financial management
The Initiative would promote a programme approach (as
against single project) in identification, preparation, appraisal
and implementation of interventions. Investments would be
based on an agreed basic service level of water supply and
sanitation, to be defined, on a country basis, taking into
account hydrological and hydro-geological conditions, popu-
lation densities and socio-economic conditions.
Financing structures for channeling funds to communities
would include adaptations of Social Funds and AGETIP-type
structures.
At the community level, implementation structures and facil-
ities management would be based on existing institutions,
local organizations, associations and women’s groups.
Capacity-building would be provided to enable the benefici-
aries to plan, execute and manage the facilities.
Implementing the initiative
Implementation would be phased, starting with a group of
countries that already have a strong policy framework and are
prepared to give necessary political commitment. Country
assessments would be carried out to form the basis of design-
ing the phasing of implementation and timetable. Seven
countries (Burkina Faso, Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda) have been tentatively
selected to pilot the implementation of the Initiative. The final
decision will be made after further elaboration of the Initiative
and acceptance by the concerned countries.
Collaboration with other initiatives
The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Initiative would col-
laborate with the African Water Facility to source some funds
as well as with other cooperating partners, such as USAID,
CIDA, JICA and Netherlands government. The Initiative would
collaborate with NEPAD in implementing policy reforms under
the integrated water resource management policy of the Bank
Group. In addition, the Initiative would use the framework of
NEPAD and the African Ministers’ Conference on Water to
generate sustained political commitment from countries.
The African Water Facility
The African Development Bank coordinated a stakeholders
Conference on Water Sustainable Development in Accra in
April 2002, to identify and establish a consensus on the main
priorities for water development in Africa, and to contribute
to a process for mobilizing the necessary financial resources.
The Conference recommended the establishment of an
African Water Facility to help mobilise the financial support
needed for meeting the urgent water needs. The
Conference further recommended that the Facility be
housed within the African Development Bank and that
detailed studies be undertaken to determine the financial
resources required, the possible sources of the fund and the
operational modalities.
The objective of the Facility is to provide investment support
for water resources management and water service provision
programmes in Africa that are designed to remove bottle-
necks and help leverage additional financial recourses from
multilateral and bilateral sources as well as from public, pri-
vate and community resources. This will be done by promot-
ing innovative actions by both countries and donors; assisting
in the creation of an enabling environment; and helping to
build governance and management capacity within imple-
menting institutions. The Facility would be defined under the
broad framework of NEPAD, the African Water Vision and the
priority areas identified at the Accra Water Conference.
An evolving Facility will require gradually increasing resources
available for investments. It is expected that the Facility should
seek to raise $300-to-500 million in the short to medium term
to leverage funds to contribute toward the $20 billion needed
annually to meet the continent’s water targets for 2025.
Initially, the Facility will focus on assisting countries gain
access to existing sources as well as additional funds that
would be made available to it. The areas of focus of the
Facility are indicated below:
The Facility aims at supporting appropriate priority programs
at the regional, sub-regional and national levels.
At the national level
● Integrated water resources management planning, proj-
ects and programmes
● Capacity building, especially in the context of program
development, affordability and procurement
● Data collection, analysis, and dissemination
● Design and carrying out of policy and institutional reform
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● Project and program preparation and implementation 
● Consensus building
● Assistance with drafting and negotiating agreements
● Regulatory instruments and monitoring capacity
● Research, training and public awarness
● Environmental management planning, projects and
programmes.
At the sub-regional and regional level, the Facility would pro-
vide support for the foregoing programmes as well as:
● Developing shared river basin visions and transboundary
environmental groups
● Securing political support
● Supporting to river basin activities, regional and subre-
gional groups
● Supporting the Monitoring Mechanism for the
Implementation of the African Water Vision 2025
● Supporting the Regional Information Cleaning House and
related information networks
● Encouraging multinational project and program prepara-
tion and implementation.
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The various proposals made in the panel’s report are sum-
marised grouped together here.
Governments’ water policies
● Each country should produce a national water policy and
plan, including specific programmes to meet the
Millennium targets and beyond. This would be detailed
in an action programme embedded in the national doc-
ument, which countries committed to produce at the
Johannesburg Earth Summit, and would be part of an
agreement for additional ODA for water. Countries
should state the indicators by which their efforts should
be judged. 
● Each country should provide predictable revenue frame-
works to its water service providers, either public or
private.
● Each country should monitor and report annually its
achievements towards the water MDGs.
● For the group of Highly Indebted Poor Countries, policies
for water should be explicitly included in national Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers to give them higher priority in
national budgets and capture some of the benefits of
debt relief for local financing of this sector.
● Governments should create an enabling environment for
the participation of the private sector in the delivery of
infrastructure services.
● Governments should adopt policies for integrated water
resources management.
● Governments should encourage municipalities of large
and middle-size cities to start working on projects for
water supply and sanitation in response to the pressure
of urbanization.
● Governments should engage in active regional and inter-
national policies to address the problems of transbound-
ary rivers and basins.
Local governments and water
authorities at sub-sovereign level
● Governments should be encouraged to mobilise national
and international training and help for their sub-sover-
eigns in relevant managerial and technical matters. 
● Central governments should set national minimum stan-
dards for provision of water services by the responsible
authorities.
● Governments, together with sub-sovereign bodies,
should define what technical and financial assistance sub-
sovereigns require to meet these standards.
● To optimise local investment capacity, local governments
and water authorities should maximise their operating
efficiency and report on their performance in meeting
these standards.
● Close contacts, including partnership associations and
twinning, should be promoted between sub-sovereigns,
intra- country, intra-regionally and internationally to
allow exchanges of experience and best practice (includ-
ing preparation of toolkits and possibly standardised
documentation).
● Contracts for private sector participation should be stan-
dardised and promoted, enabling sub-sovereigns to
employ private companies under incentive-driven con-
tracts to raise efficiency and performance.
● Central governments should provide incentives for good
reporting by their sub-sovereigns—for example by relat-
ing some central transfers to the quality of reporting.
Annex 3.
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● National governments should create a central agency to
collect, publish and compare sub-sovereigns’ financial
and management information (including benchmarking
of key operating parameters), and generally improve the
transparency of these operations. The agency should
encourage civil society to monitor whether the services
received by the community are consistent with the reports
received. Donors should support such an agency, using
public and private sector expertise in administrative, legal
and financial areas.
● Governments should clearly define their fiscal relationship
with sub-sovereigns.
● Governments should be encouraged to allow and facili-
tate limited intercepts into domestic fiscal transfers to
give partial security to lenders to sub-sovereigns. 
● Donors should be ready to provide technical assistance to
sub-sovereigns for analysing and designing water
projects.
● Donors should be ready to channel aid to sub-sovereigns
requiring funding on concessional terms for water projects.
● A Revolving Fund should be created, using grants to
finance the public preparation and structuring costs of
complex projects such as private participation projects
and other innovative structures.
● Sub-sovereign entities should consider the option of
retaining assets in public ownership, with continuing pub-
lic responsibility for investment finance, and with opera-
tions privately financed and managed. 
Promoting local capital markets and
savings 
● Governments and central banks should put in place meas-
ures to promote local capital markets and address prob-
lems caused by their own actions in crowding out other
borrowers. Larger countries should lift remaining barriers
to the use of local funding, where they are redundant.
● Governments, with the help of MFIs and donors, should
be asked to promote the rating of sub-sovereigns, to facil-
itate their financing but also to enable transparency and
the tracking of behavior.
● Governments should consider taking steps to permit the
development of domestic borrowing markets for sub-
sovereigns.
● Governments should encourage and facilitate the entry of
rating agencies and bond insurance and financial guar-
antee companies into their domestic capital markets.
● With appropriate reforms made in the light of lessons
from previous experience, national development banks or
specialised financial institutions should develop a role as
intermediaries for channeling external and central gov-
ernment funds, and funds raised in local markets, to sub-
sovereign bodies operating in the water sector. 
● Governments should encourage the creation of credit
pools for sub-sovereigns, with an option of joint and sev-
eral liability. 
● MFIs and other agencies should extend their use of guar-
antees and the issue of local currency bonds to promote
local capital markets, extend the maturity of local loans,
and encourage the use of local pension funds in the water
sector. They should urgently address statutory and man-
agerial obstacles to their further use of these instruments.
Sustainable cost recovery
● The panel proposes that the aim of water service
providers should be sustainable cost recovery, which
means that:
• Service providers should aim for revenues sufficient to
cover their recurrent costs, and they should develop
sustainable long-term cost recovery policies, anticipat-
ing all future cash flow needs. SCR includes operating
and financing costs as well as the cost of renewing
existing infrastructure. 
• Revenues arising from charges should be covered by
users as a group. Under SCR, not all users would pay
the same price. Individual affordability of water
charges should be ensured by appropriate tariff struc-
tures including local cross-subsidisation (for example,
by setting a rising block tariff structure) or by individ-
ually targeted and transparent pro-poor policies.
• The part of recurrent revenues provided by taxpayers
from public budgets should be secured by agreeing
well in advance the allocation of sufficient fiscal
transfers. 
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● Where subsidies are used they should be targeted, trans-
parent and (where intended to ease the transition to
higher tariffs) tapering.
Increasing managerial capacity in
water institutions 
● Funding for capacity development in water institutions
should be a high priority for the use of ODA and MFI
funds. 
● Donors should support cooperation and partnership
agreements, preferably involving experienced and rep-
utable public partners, as a means of strengthening core
public capacities. These should state mutual responsibili-
ties and contain performance targets and incentives
applying to both parties. 
● The panel recommends the concept of joint working on
problems and learning while doing in public-public part-
nerships as well as in cooperation agreements between
utilities and companies. Such cooperation could be within
a country, or North-South or South-South. 
● Donors should finance trust funds in the MFIs for using
specialists with strong practical experience at the appro-
priate level to assist in the transfer of skills.
● In implementing the MDG targets, donors should support
action planning, in which planning and project prepara-
tion are wrapped into aid projects. 
● ODA should be provided for the work of regional profes-
sional associations in support of training, professional
exchanges, and data collection and benchmarking.
● ODA technical cooperation should be used to help the
preparation, structuring and implementation of private
participation contracts, such as BOT and other conces-
sions, management contracts, and leases, as a means of
enhancing on-the-job capacity building.
Legal and regulatory environment,
corruption and ethical practices
● Capacity development in the core public institutions of
the water sector should aim to define and implement a
water policy, set a regulatory framework and create a
basis for commissioning and controlling executing work,
whether performed by private or public agents.
● A study should be funded for the preparation of best
practice and model clauses in the legal agreements for
private participation, with particular reference to the
water sector. 
● Executing agencies should be made attractive for high-
calibre leadership, accountable for performance and
delivery. Integrity standards should be worked out coop-
eratively by all interested parties.
● The decentralised nature of water services is an opportu-
nity for different mixes of public, private and self-help
options, and for competition between them. The choice
between them should be pragmatic, eschewing ideology.
● The high political profile of water should be used to cre-
ate more transparency for its operations. Public opinion,
user associations and NGOs should be encouraged to
monitor and publicise the activities of water organisations
and expose corrupt practices .
● Private and public companies engaged in the water sec-
tor are urged to cooperate with public clients and other
parties to develop methods for promoting ethical behav-
iour. Private participation contracts should be fully
transparent.
ODA
● Governments of developed countries should be held to
account for their commitments to increase aid to the
water sector. Overall ODA for water should be doubled,
as a first step. Donors and MFIs should aim to make sub-
stantial increases in the share of water in their total
commitments. 
● Individual donors should contribute their share towards
this target, depending on the size of their current aid to
the water sector. This ODA increase should preferably be
in the form of grants rather than concessional loans.
● Donors should keep funds available for rewarding coun-
tries that make early progress on implementation of
water programmes in fulfilment of the MDGs.
● Donor agencies should work, under the guidance of the
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, UN agen-
cies, and the Development Committee, to implement the
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DAC’s recommendations on increasing the effectiveness
of aid and improve the coordination of their efforts in this
sector. 
● In view of the capital intensity nature of water invest-
ments, and the need for front loading ODA, means
should be found for governments to create a special
national or international facility to pre-finance disburse-
ments budgeted for a later period. 
● Rather than funding entire projects or programmes
through grants, with the risk of smothering local initia-
tives and discouraging financial self-sufficiency, donors
should regard their funds as catalysts to mobilise other
flows and empower other players.
● The panel encourages the parties involved to enter ‘debt
for water’ swaps as a means of increasing local currency
funds available for water projects.
● The panel invites the DAC to consider amending its pre-
sentations of national ODA performance to reflect prop-
erly the status of guarantees.
● Geographically, ODA should favour those countries,
especially in Africa, where the water service deficit is
greatest and where most remains to be done to meet the
water MDG targets. 
● Within countries, grant ODA for water and sanitation
should be directed to regions, settlements and social
groups where public subsidy is necessary. 
● Within the water sector, ODA should also be used for
services that have to be financed publicly because it is not
feasible to provide them privately, such as water resource
management, large water storage schemes, flood control
and major irrigation and drainage projects. 
● Bilateral ODA should be applied in support of various cur-
rent important multilateral initiatives, such as the African
Water Initiative, AfDB’s Rural Water Supply and
Sanitation Initiative and the FAO’s Special Programme of
Food Security, among others.
● Aid should be used to catalyse other financial flows by
such means as funding initial overhead costs, providing
equity for revolving funds, guarantees, and subsidies tar-
geted to performance (such as output-based aid).
● Donors should report annually about the impact of their
aid on achieving water MDGs by publishing :
• The number of people they have helped to get access
to water and sanitation.
• The average “aid efficiency” of their water projects:
that is, the foregoing number of people divided by the
grant value of their aid. 
• The “leverage effect” of their aid, namely, the total
amount of financing mobilised on water projects they
have aided. 
Multilateral financial institutions
(MFIs)
● MFIs that do not now lend to sub-sovereign entities
should reconsider their policies, with the aim of permit-
ting such lending in appropriate cases, subject to normal
prudential criteria.
● MFIs should revise their policies on capital provisioning,
where these are undue constraints on the use of
guarantees.
● MFIs subject to the participation requirement should con-
sider amending their articles to enable them to have the
freedom to issue guarantees on a standalone basis.
● MFIs and donors should resume lending to essential sur-
face and underground water storage projects, subject to
adequate social and environmental safeguards.
● New instruments and funds to be created should prefer-
ably be located in, and coordinated by, the regional devel-
opment banks.
International commercial lending 
● Banks should focus initially on concluding suitable trans-
actions, picking the low hanging fruit, and starting to
develop a track record and creating a market precedent.
● As the market for water projects develops, banks should
attempt to standardise documentation and simplify the
financial and commercial process. They should encourage
the development of local capital markets in which proj-
ects can obtain part or all of their funding to enable bet-
ter currency matching of revenues with borrowings.
● MFIs and ECAs should enhance and extend political risk
coverage for projects, including the use of MFI guaran-
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tees and relaxation in ECA rules on guarantees and
insurance.
● Banks and other lenders should develop and employ
innovative financing techniques such as securitisation or
collateralisation of loan-debt obligations (that is, com-
bining a number of individual project loans into pack-
ages, taken up by other lenders).
● A new Devaluation Liquidity Backstopping Facility is pro-
posed as one method of mitigating the risk of foreign
exchange fluctuations in water projects at the sub-sover-
eign level.
Export credit agencies (ECAs)
● The OECD should consider incorporating into the
Arrangement a requirement that 2–3% of aggregate
ECA credit be directed annually to water projects. 
● The OECD should consider allowing 20-year repayment
terms (the current limit is 10 years) for water, and give
special term flexibility for this sector and allow more free-
dom to shape the repayment profile to cash flows.
● The OECD should consider raising the limit on credit for
local costs for water projects from 15% (the current max-
imum) to 50% of the export value.
● ECAs should consider offering guarantees and loans in
local currency.
Private investment and operation
● Governments and water authorities should recognise the
present and potential role of small-scale water service
providers (SSWSPs) and other parts of the local private
sector, and provide a legal framework to encourage
greater long-term investments by them.
● Governments should include SSWSPs in their national
water supply strategies and service development plans,
including incentives for them to improve their services. 
● SSWSPs should be encouraged to improve their access to
finance to increase their capacity to invest in the sector
and reduce their cost of capital.
● Where public authorities are considering reforms of the
water sector, or tenders of various kinds are being drawn
up, private participation should be included as an option,
to be decided on specific grounds of efficiency, cost and
effectiveness. Procurement decisions should as a rule be
made on the basis of open and transparent competition,
typically through bidding. 
● Donors and governments should be open to financing
water projects by combining public funds with private
financing in transparent and acceptable ways.
● ODA should be available to facilitate water projects man-
aged by private operators under public control—for
example output-based aid could be used to expand net-
works or fund revenue shortfalls on a diminishing basis
under a concession. ODA could also be used to finance
investment in assets owned by the public and operated
by the private sector.
● Guarantee and insurance schemes offered by MFIs, gov-
ernments and export credit agencies should be expanded
in scope, and the internal constraints on their use should
be relaxed. The specific needs of potential private opera-
tors in the water sector should be kept in view. 
● Governments taking up private participation should pro-
vide adequate securities to create trust in the sustainabil-
ity of long-term contracts.
Community initiatives and service-
oriented NGOs
● The roles of civil society groups as service providers, advo-
cates, participants in planning processes and watchdogs
need to be supported, and their capacity to perform them
more effectively needs enhancing. 
● Micro-credit schemes available for financing community
water projects should be supported by donors, MFIs and
external NGOs through the provision of seed capital, ini-
tial reserves and guarantees. Continuing subsidies
should, however, be avoided.
● External NGOs should propose ways of raising more
funds through the various kinds of solidarity mechanisms
for channeling to their local partners.
● A full study should be conducted of the feasibility of cre-
ating a Decentralised Fund for the Development of Local
Initiatives. 
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Implementation of the proposals
● 2006 should be the first check-point on the route to
2015. This would be an opportunity to review the meas-
ures endorsed at Kyoto and at subsequent gatherings,
and actions taken to implement them. 
● 2015 should be the next essential check-point, opening
the third stage of a strategy leading to universal access
and sanitation by 2025.
● A “global control tower” should be established to moni-
tor and report on the progress made towards achieve-
ment of the MDGs for water and sanitation, and the
performance of the main parties involved in implement-
ing and funding these activities. To complement this, a
group of “wise persons” should be formed to evaluate
this information, monitor developments and make rec-
ommendations on the steps needed to secure the water
MDGs.
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